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(Jerusalem Post) Uri Resnick -Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was one of the clearest and most authoritative exponents of the case for Israel's need for defensible borders. In an October 1976 article in Foreign Affairs, Allon noted that whereas Israel's rivals seek to "isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world's map," Israel's strategic aims have been focused on its "imperative to survive." Thus, even if peace agreements are reached, border and security arrangements must ensure Israel's ability to defend itself in the event that such agreements are breached. As the recent upheavals in the Middle East have clearly demonstrated, this guiding principle has not lost its salience. Israel has considerable grounds to expect security threats to persist, even subsequent to an agreement, as long as substantial Palestinian territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel persist. Territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel and tolerance for violence can be expected to persist in Palestinian society at least partly because they have been, and continue to be, deliberately cultivated by Palestinian elites, as has been extensively documented by organizations that monitor Palestinian society and media. Access to an international border would provide Palestinian militants with the opportunity to continue - and expand - violent activities against Israel. Thus, forcing Israel into indefensible borders, such as those of June 4, 1967, is unlikely to lead to a stable regional order. Insofar as comparative, empirical research can serve as a guide, relinquishing an Israeli presence along some of the borders of a Palestinian state will severely diminish the chances of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and will probably exacerbate it. Thus, to prevent the emergence of a heavily armed, hostile Palestinian state dominating Israel's 15-kilometer-wide heartland - precisely as has transpired pursuant to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and relinquishing of control over Gaza's southern boundary - Israel will have to maintain a perimeter presence along the borders of a Palestinian state. This implies a continuing Israeli presence - along the Jordan Valley. Maintaining an Israeli presence along the Jordan Valley is entirely compatible with the establishment of a contiguous, viable Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. The area lies exclusively to the east of the main Palestinian population centers, such that its omission would not interfere with contiguity. Excluding the Jordan Valley from the territory of a Palestinian state would also have negligible demographic implications since, according to Palestinian statistics, approximately 10,000 Palestinians reside in those parts of the Jordan Valley that were not already passed over to Palestinian civilian control under the Oslo Accords - less than .05% of the Palestinian population. The writer serves as policy adviser to the minister of foreign affairs and lectures on game theory and territorial conflict at the IDC Herzliya. 2011-11-15 00:00:00Full Article
The Empirical Case for Defensible Borders
(Jerusalem Post) Uri Resnick -Former Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon was one of the clearest and most authoritative exponents of the case for Israel's need for defensible borders. In an October 1976 article in Foreign Affairs, Allon noted that whereas Israel's rivals seek to "isolate, strangle and erase Israel from the world's map," Israel's strategic aims have been focused on its "imperative to survive." Thus, even if peace agreements are reached, border and security arrangements must ensure Israel's ability to defend itself in the event that such agreements are breached. As the recent upheavals in the Middle East have clearly demonstrated, this guiding principle has not lost its salience. Israel has considerable grounds to expect security threats to persist, even subsequent to an agreement, as long as substantial Palestinian territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel persist. Territorial claims to pre-1967 Israel and tolerance for violence can be expected to persist in Palestinian society at least partly because they have been, and continue to be, deliberately cultivated by Palestinian elites, as has been extensively documented by organizations that monitor Palestinian society and media. Access to an international border would provide Palestinian militants with the opportunity to continue - and expand - violent activities against Israel. Thus, forcing Israel into indefensible borders, such as those of June 4, 1967, is unlikely to lead to a stable regional order. Insofar as comparative, empirical research can serve as a guide, relinquishing an Israeli presence along some of the borders of a Palestinian state will severely diminish the chances of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and will probably exacerbate it. Thus, to prevent the emergence of a heavily armed, hostile Palestinian state dominating Israel's 15-kilometer-wide heartland - precisely as has transpired pursuant to Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and relinquishing of control over Gaza's southern boundary - Israel will have to maintain a perimeter presence along the borders of a Palestinian state. This implies a continuing Israeli presence - along the Jordan Valley. Maintaining an Israeli presence along the Jordan Valley is entirely compatible with the establishment of a contiguous, viable Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. The area lies exclusively to the east of the main Palestinian population centers, such that its omission would not interfere with contiguity. Excluding the Jordan Valley from the territory of a Palestinian state would also have negligible demographic implications since, according to Palestinian statistics, approximately 10,000 Palestinians reside in those parts of the Jordan Valley that were not already passed over to Palestinian civilian control under the Oslo Accords - less than .05% of the Palestinian population. The writer serves as policy adviser to the minister of foreign affairs and lectures on game theory and territorial conflict at the IDC Herzliya. 2011-11-15 00:00:00Full Article
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