Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Patrick Clawson - Some Iranian leaders seem to believe they could advance four of their main goals through armed conflict with the U.S.: namely, resisting "global arrogance," creating disorder in the oil markets, justifying nuclear breakout, and rallying the nation. The Iranian navy still regards its 1988 confrontation with the U.S. - sparked by the mining of a U.S. warship - as a great victory that it studies closely, despite the sinking of several Iranian vessels. If Iran got lucky and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers around the world might conclude that the U.S. Navy had lost the war no matter what happened next. When the U.S. got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via confrontation in the Gulf. The best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the U.S. has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. The writer is director of research and head of the Iran Security Initiative at The Washington Institute. 2012-01-20 00:00:00Full Article
Calculating Victory: How Iran Views Confronting the U.S.
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Patrick Clawson - Some Iranian leaders seem to believe they could advance four of their main goals through armed conflict with the U.S.: namely, resisting "global arrogance," creating disorder in the oil markets, justifying nuclear breakout, and rallying the nation. The Iranian navy still regards its 1988 confrontation with the U.S. - sparked by the mining of a U.S. warship - as a great victory that it studies closely, despite the sinking of several Iranian vessels. If Iran got lucky and sank a U.S. warship during an actual conflict, television viewers around the world might conclude that the U.S. Navy had lost the war no matter what happened next. When the U.S. got its nose bloodied by the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing and the 1993 Somali "Black Hawk down" incident, Washington withdrew its forces from both countries. Iran may hope for the same result via confrontation in the Gulf. The best prospect for persuading Khamenei to revert to his past cautiousness is to clearly lay out that the U.S. has red lines which, if crossed, will cost Iran dearly. The writer is director of research and head of the Iran Security Initiative at The Washington Institute. 2012-01-20 00:00:00Full Article
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