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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
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- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
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- Jennifer Rubin
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- Shimon Shapira
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- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
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- Michael Young
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Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
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[Arms Control Today] Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou - Iran appears to be North Korea's most likely customer or partner for nuclear technologies. Iran seems to be on a determined path to nuclear weapons. It began its covert uranium-enrichment program nearly 20 years ago but has only recently publicly demonstrated its ability to produce low-enriched uranium. However, the sale of plutonium represents the gravest and most immediate threat. Obtaining 10 to 20 kilograms of plutonium from North Korea, would catapult Iran into nuclear-weapon status. North Korea is unlikely to encounter serious hurdles if it was to ship plutonium to Iran, and detecting such shipments would be very difficult. Iran has money and oil, just what Pyongyang needs most. The two countries have long-standing collaborations in ballistic missiles dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. North Korea helped Iran establish a missile assembly facility and provided the required technical documentation for future production. Key engineers and military personnel were exchanged on a regular basis, and missile cooperation continues today. If the six-party agreement falls through, Iran could help finance an expanded North Korean nuclear weapons program. Siegfried S. Hecker is co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He was director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 to 1997. William Liou is a technical staff member at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 2007-04-17 01:00:00Full Article
Dangerous Dealings: North Korea's Nuclear Capabilities and the Threat of Export to Iran
[Arms Control Today] Siegfried S. Hecker and William Liou - Iran appears to be North Korea's most likely customer or partner for nuclear technologies. Iran seems to be on a determined path to nuclear weapons. It began its covert uranium-enrichment program nearly 20 years ago but has only recently publicly demonstrated its ability to produce low-enriched uranium. However, the sale of plutonium represents the gravest and most immediate threat. Obtaining 10 to 20 kilograms of plutonium from North Korea, would catapult Iran into nuclear-weapon status. North Korea is unlikely to encounter serious hurdles if it was to ship plutonium to Iran, and detecting such shipments would be very difficult. Iran has money and oil, just what Pyongyang needs most. The two countries have long-standing collaborations in ballistic missiles dating back to the Iran-Iraq War. North Korea helped Iran establish a missile assembly facility and provided the required technical documentation for future production. Key engineers and military personnel were exchanged on a regular basis, and missile cooperation continues today. If the six-party agreement falls through, Iran could help finance an expanded North Korean nuclear weapons program. Siegfried S. Hecker is co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He was director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 to 1997. William Liou is a technical staff member at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 2007-04-17 01:00:00Full Article
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