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(National Interest) Amos Yadlin and Yoel Guzansky - An additional round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran about the nuclear issue is due to take place in Baghdad in May. In any possible deal, the assumption is that Iran will be granted legitimacy to enrich uranium on its soil. Thus, the difference between a "good deal" and a "bad deal" lies in parameters of Iran's enrichment that would prevent it from breaking out towards nuclear weapons. A bad deal, one that the Iranians are likely to offer and that the international community would be tempted to accept, would include explicit legitimacy for Iran enriching uranium on its soil up to the 5% level but would not include removal of most of the already-enriched uranium from within Iran's borders. The bad deal also would include not limiting the number or type of centrifuges and enrichment sites. Iran then would be able to continue securing its sites in a way that would make damaging them much harder than it is at present. With such a deal, Iran would be able to improve its chances of breaking out toward nuclear weapons in a relatively short time after making the decision to do so. Israel would find it hard to live with a situation in which Iran could at any moment decide to break out toward rapid nuclear-weapons manufacturing thanks to an extensive nuclear infrastructure and a significant amount of enriched uranium. The American red line is an Iranian breaking out toward nuclear arms. According to Washington, the U.S. would know of this development ahead of time. Israel is not convinced and has expressed its reluctance to accept that risk. The result is that a compromise with Iran also means a deepening gulf and widening disagreement between Israel and the U.S. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin is director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He served as the IDF's chief of defense intelligence and as deputy commander of the Israel Air Force. Yoel Guzansky is a senior research fellow at INSS and a former member of Israel's National Security Council. 2012-05-04 00:00:00Full Article
Beware a Bad Deal with Tehran
(National Interest) Amos Yadlin and Yoel Guzansky - An additional round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran about the nuclear issue is due to take place in Baghdad in May. In any possible deal, the assumption is that Iran will be granted legitimacy to enrich uranium on its soil. Thus, the difference between a "good deal" and a "bad deal" lies in parameters of Iran's enrichment that would prevent it from breaking out towards nuclear weapons. A bad deal, one that the Iranians are likely to offer and that the international community would be tempted to accept, would include explicit legitimacy for Iran enriching uranium on its soil up to the 5% level but would not include removal of most of the already-enriched uranium from within Iran's borders. The bad deal also would include not limiting the number or type of centrifuges and enrichment sites. Iran then would be able to continue securing its sites in a way that would make damaging them much harder than it is at present. With such a deal, Iran would be able to improve its chances of breaking out toward nuclear weapons in a relatively short time after making the decision to do so. Israel would find it hard to live with a situation in which Iran could at any moment decide to break out toward rapid nuclear-weapons manufacturing thanks to an extensive nuclear infrastructure and a significant amount of enriched uranium. The American red line is an Iranian breaking out toward nuclear arms. According to Washington, the U.S. would know of this development ahead of time. Israel is not convinced and has expressed its reluctance to accept that risk. The result is that a compromise with Iran also means a deepening gulf and widening disagreement between Israel and the U.S. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin is director of Tel Aviv University's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He served as the IDF's chief of defense intelligence and as deputy commander of the Israel Air Force. Yoel Guzansky is a senior research fellow at INSS and a former member of Israel's National Security Council. 2012-05-04 00:00:00Full Article
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