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Tunnel Vision in Gaza

(Middle East Quarterly) Doron Almog- The Philadelphi corridor is a narrow stretch of sand, ten kilometers long and about a hundred meters wide, separating Egypt from the Gaza Strip - a zone established and defined by the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace accord. The term "smuggling" does not do justice to the problem. While some smuggling, overland or by tunnel, involves contraband and drugs, in Gaza this smuggling has a strategic dimension, involving the importation of significant quantities of arms and materiel on a scale sufficient to turn Gaza into a launching pad for ever-deeper attacks against Israel proper. Informally, the Egyptians have signaled that the moment the Israeli-Palestinian issue is resolved, smuggling and infiltration will be dramatically reduced. But this notion is wholly mistaken. Not only does the smuggling have a strong economic incentive, but it is also linked to ideological groups that have far-reaching objectives that reject the authority of the Egyptian government and the PA. Regardless of the disengagement plan, the common goal of Israel and Egypt should be the 100% prevention of smuggling and infiltration from Egypt to Israel. The two partners to the peace treaty should tackle this problem both independently and jointly. On the strategic level, the issue has to be placed in its proper context: as another front in the global war on terror. The U.S. must make clear that the present situation on the Egyptian-Israeli border is potentially as dangerous as the situation on the Afghan-Pakistani border, and that Egypt bears responsibility for bringing order to this zone, lest it become the de facto province of international terrorists. The U.S. must make it clear that the present Egyptian policy, allowing smuggling and infiltration as a release valve for public sympathy for the Palestinian armed struggle, is itself a concession to global terrorism. A high level of Egyptian involvement could easily result in the export of its own problems into Gaza. In addition, were the disengagement gamble to fail, a high level of Egyptian involvement in Gaza could put Israel and Egypt on a collision course, damaging relations between the two states. Thus, Israel has no alternative but to insist on minimal Egyptian involvement in post-disengagement Gaza. There is no alternative to a border regime that rests on forceful deterrence, active interdiction, and swift reprisal. And that means there is no alternative to Israel's continuing presence at this crucial point on the regional map. Maj. Gen. Doron Almog served as head of Israel's Southern Command from 2000 to 2003.
2004-08-18 00:00:00
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