Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Wall Street Journal Europe) Daniel Schwammenthal - In exchange for technical support and a few eased trade restrictions, the P5+1 demand that Iran, as a first step, stop enriching uranium to 20%; ship abroad its stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium; and close the underground Fordo enrichment facility. Faithfully implemented, such a deal would certainly delay parts of Iran's enrichment program. But it would not stop Iran's march toward nuclear-weapons capabilities, and might even offer certain advantages for its atomic plans. Particularly troubling is that Iran would be allowed to keep and even grow its stockpile of 3.5%-enriched uranium, only this time with de-facto international approval. That would be a significant political and military victory for the regime, since it would permit Iran to stay much closer to a bomb. As Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has repeatedly pointed out, mastering low enrichment of 3.5% is 70% of the enrichment effort required for an atomic weapon. With 20%-enriched uranium, you are 90% there. By mid-May, Iran had accumulated enough 3.5% to fuel - if further enriched - at least four nuclear weapons. Critically, partly controlling Tehran's enrichment activities would do nothing to disrupt the other elements of the regime's nuclear-weapons development program, including triggers, computer simulations of nuclear explosions, ballistic missiles and fitting them with nuclear warheads. The writer is director of the AJC Transatlantic Institute in Brussels. 2012-06-13 00:00:00Full Article
A Good Deal for Tehran
(Wall Street Journal Europe) Daniel Schwammenthal - In exchange for technical support and a few eased trade restrictions, the P5+1 demand that Iran, as a first step, stop enriching uranium to 20%; ship abroad its stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium; and close the underground Fordo enrichment facility. Faithfully implemented, such a deal would certainly delay parts of Iran's enrichment program. But it would not stop Iran's march toward nuclear-weapons capabilities, and might even offer certain advantages for its atomic plans. Particularly troubling is that Iran would be allowed to keep and even grow its stockpile of 3.5%-enriched uranium, only this time with de-facto international approval. That would be a significant political and military victory for the regime, since it would permit Iran to stay much closer to a bomb. As Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, has repeatedly pointed out, mastering low enrichment of 3.5% is 70% of the enrichment effort required for an atomic weapon. With 20%-enriched uranium, you are 90% there. By mid-May, Iran had accumulated enough 3.5% to fuel - if further enriched - at least four nuclear weapons. Critically, partly controlling Tehran's enrichment activities would do nothing to disrupt the other elements of the regime's nuclear-weapons development program, including triggers, computer simulations of nuclear explosions, ballistic missiles and fitting them with nuclear warheads. The writer is director of the AJC Transatlantic Institute in Brussels. 2012-06-13 00:00:00Full Article
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