Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Center for Strategic and International Studies) Anthony H. Cordesman - There are times when the best way to prevent war is to clearly communicate that it is possible. It is not clear that Iran truly understands the growing risk it faces that years of Israeli and U.S. warnings can turn into action. To limit the risk of war as much as possible, there are three actions the U.S. could take. The first is to reshape the focus of negotiations around clear U.S. red lines. If we really mean we have a military option and will act on it, we need to be far less ambiguous. Iran needs to know there are real limits to how long it can talk and stall. The second action is to make it clear to Iran that it has no successful options. There are many ways in which U.S. analysts with official connections can suggest how easy it would be to escalate to the point of destroying Iran's refineries and power grid, suppressing its air defenses, and reacting to any low level of asymmetric attack by destroying key Iranian military objectives. The U.S. can make clear that it might not simply target known and suspect nuclear facilities, but missile and military industrial facilities as well. The U.S. can point out that it does not have to destroy hardened Iranian targets. All it has to do is keep closing the access entrances with repetitive strikes. The third option is to put the best possible incentives on the table for Iran to accept a negotiated solution in ways that allow it to claim a kind of victory and save face. The writer holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. 2012-08-02 00:00:00Full Article
Iran: Preventing War by Making It Credible
(Center for Strategic and International Studies) Anthony H. Cordesman - There are times when the best way to prevent war is to clearly communicate that it is possible. It is not clear that Iran truly understands the growing risk it faces that years of Israeli and U.S. warnings can turn into action. To limit the risk of war as much as possible, there are three actions the U.S. could take. The first is to reshape the focus of negotiations around clear U.S. red lines. If we really mean we have a military option and will act on it, we need to be far less ambiguous. Iran needs to know there are real limits to how long it can talk and stall. The second action is to make it clear to Iran that it has no successful options. There are many ways in which U.S. analysts with official connections can suggest how easy it would be to escalate to the point of destroying Iran's refineries and power grid, suppressing its air defenses, and reacting to any low level of asymmetric attack by destroying key Iranian military objectives. The U.S. can make clear that it might not simply target known and suspect nuclear facilities, but missile and military industrial facilities as well. The U.S. can point out that it does not have to destroy hardened Iranian targets. All it has to do is keep closing the access entrances with repetitive strikes. The third option is to put the best possible incentives on the table for Iran to accept a negotiated solution in ways that allow it to claim a kind of victory and save face. The writer holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. 2012-08-02 00:00:00Full Article
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