Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog - The outbreak of Palestinian violence in late September 2000 peaked in March 2002, a month during which 135 Israelis were killed and over 700 wounded. Lethal attacks occurred almost daily, and Israelis lost their sense of personal and national security. In response, the Israeli government adopted two strategic decisions designed to halt the deteriorating situation: first, to implement large-scale and continuous offensive measures to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure inside Palestinian cities and refugee camps, an effort that evolved into "Operation Defensive Shield"; and second, to take the defensive step of constructing a physical barrier - the West Bank fence - to block the free passage of terrorists into Israel. After long internal deliberation, Israel concluded that its campaign against terrorism would be best served if the "political" leadership of such groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad no longer enjoyed immunity from retaliation. The Israeli mindset evolved from dealing solely with suicide bombers to dealing with the producers and launchers of these "ticking bombs." It took Israel more than three years to reach the decision to eliminate Yassin and Rantisi. The result of these actions was a considerable weakening of Hamas. Since March 2002, Israel has managed to reduce the number of terrorist attacks as well as the number of its fatalities by about 70%. There is still no shortage of Palestinian young people willing to volunteer for suicide bombings. Their motivation emanates primarily from the deteriorating political and socioeconomic situation and from extremist indoctrination, which continues unabated and h2004-10-15 00:00:00Full Article
The Palestinian Intifada: Lessons and Prospects (Part II)
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog - The outbreak of Palestinian violence in late September 2000 peaked in March 2002, a month during which 135 Israelis were killed and over 700 wounded. Lethal attacks occurred almost daily, and Israelis lost their sense of personal and national security. In response, the Israeli government adopted two strategic decisions designed to halt the deteriorating situation: first, to implement large-scale and continuous offensive measures to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure inside Palestinian cities and refugee camps, an effort that evolved into "Operation Defensive Shield"; and second, to take the defensive step of constructing a physical barrier - the West Bank fence - to block the free passage of terrorists into Israel. After long internal deliberation, Israel concluded that its campaign against terrorism would be best served if the "political" leadership of such groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad no longer enjoyed immunity from retaliation. The Israeli mindset evolved from dealing solely with suicide bombers to dealing with the producers and launchers of these "ticking bombs." It took Israel more than three years to reach the decision to eliminate Yassin and Rantisi. The result of these actions was a considerable weakening of Hamas. Since March 2002, Israel has managed to reduce the number of terrorist attacks as well as the number of its fatalities by about 70%. There is still no shortage of Palestinian young people willing to volunteer for suicide bombings. Their motivation emanates primarily from the deteriorating political and socioeconomic situation and from extremist indoctrination, which continues unabated and h2004-10-15 00:00:00Full Article
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