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(Israel Hayom) Dore Gold - As a result of the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army captured thousands of hours of recordings of highly-classified meetings of the Iraqi leadership on the subject of how they viewed the purpose of nuclear weapons in the future as well as how they envisioned their use in the context of a war against Israel. So how did Saddam Hussein view the utility of nuclear weapons in a future conflict with Israel? Contrary to the theories of many experts on international relations in the U.S., who claim that states seek to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes alone in order to enhance deterrence against their neighbors, the Iraqi documents indicate that Saddam Hussein's regime clearly had offensive goals in mind. Saddam's strategic thinking was surprising, for he explained that Iraqi nuclear weapons would neutralize what many believed was Israel's nuclear capacity, thereby allowing Iraq to wage conventional war against Israel. What Saddam's strategy illustrates is that the military use of nuclear weapons on the part of an adversary of Israel is very different from the role nuclear weapons played during the Cold War, despite the efforts of some analysts to apply the Soviet-American experience to the current Iranian threat. Much has changed since the time of these Iraqi documents and the threats Israel might face are evolving. But it would be a mistake to imagine that they have disappeared completely, and much will depend upon the question of whether Iraq becomes a truly independent state or ends up being an Iranian satellite that serves as a springboard for its forces in the future. Saddam's thinking about the relationship of nuclear weapons and conventional war is important to note for one other reason. In the debate over Israel's future borders in the West Bank, it is frequently argued that in the age of missiles - especially if they are armed with weapons of mass destruction - topography, terrain, and strategic depth are no longer relevant and hence Israel can give them up in future peace arrangements. This thesis, if widely accepted, could have enormous implications for areas like the Jordan Valley, undermining Israel's goal of obtaining defensible borders in any peace settlement. But if the purpose of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel's enemies is to make it safe for them to return to the era of conventional wars, then Israel must not be forced to concede its most vital territorial assets based on the unfounded notion that they no longer matter in the nuclear era. The writer, Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 2012-09-07 00:00:00Full Article
Nuclear Weapons from Saddam to Iran: The Surprising Lessons for Israel from Captured Iraqi Documents
(Israel Hayom) Dore Gold - As a result of the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army captured thousands of hours of recordings of highly-classified meetings of the Iraqi leadership on the subject of how they viewed the purpose of nuclear weapons in the future as well as how they envisioned their use in the context of a war against Israel. So how did Saddam Hussein view the utility of nuclear weapons in a future conflict with Israel? Contrary to the theories of many experts on international relations in the U.S., who claim that states seek to acquire nuclear weapons for defensive purposes alone in order to enhance deterrence against their neighbors, the Iraqi documents indicate that Saddam Hussein's regime clearly had offensive goals in mind. Saddam's strategic thinking was surprising, for he explained that Iraqi nuclear weapons would neutralize what many believed was Israel's nuclear capacity, thereby allowing Iraq to wage conventional war against Israel. What Saddam's strategy illustrates is that the military use of nuclear weapons on the part of an adversary of Israel is very different from the role nuclear weapons played during the Cold War, despite the efforts of some analysts to apply the Soviet-American experience to the current Iranian threat. Much has changed since the time of these Iraqi documents and the threats Israel might face are evolving. But it would be a mistake to imagine that they have disappeared completely, and much will depend upon the question of whether Iraq becomes a truly independent state or ends up being an Iranian satellite that serves as a springboard for its forces in the future. Saddam's thinking about the relationship of nuclear weapons and conventional war is important to note for one other reason. In the debate over Israel's future borders in the West Bank, it is frequently argued that in the age of missiles - especially if they are armed with weapons of mass destruction - topography, terrain, and strategic depth are no longer relevant and hence Israel can give them up in future peace arrangements. This thesis, if widely accepted, could have enormous implications for areas like the Jordan Valley, undermining Israel's goal of obtaining defensible borders in any peace settlement. But if the purpose of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel's enemies is to make it safe for them to return to the era of conventional wars, then Israel must not be forced to concede its most vital territorial assets based on the unfounded notion that they no longer matter in the nuclear era. The writer, Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 2012-09-07 00:00:00Full Article
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