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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen - International diplomacy concerning Iran's nuclear program centers on the regime's lack of compliance with agreements it has signed to ensure that peaceful nuclear work is not used as a cover for weapons development. Iran's current 20%-enrichment level sounds a long way from the 90% needed for a bomb, but this is not the case. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to explain why in the drawing he displayed during his September UN address. In fact, most of the work of producing weapons-grade material has already been done once 20% is reached. The problem in allowing Iran to continue any enrichment work without a clear indication that it has given up nuclear military ambitions is twofold. First, its competence with centrifuge technology will likely improve, and second, it will eventually develop improved centrifuges to replace its existing low-efficiency machines, allowing it to rapidly produce larger quantities of weapons-grade material. Iran already has 240 kg. of 20%-enriched uranium - an amount that, if further enriched, could produce a simple atomic bomb (in IAEA jargon, a "significant quantity.") Although some of its uranium stock has been made into fuel plates for a research reactor, this material could be converted back to centrifuge feedstock within a few months. Accordingly, current estimates indicate that Iran could produce up to four "significant quantities" of weapons-grade uranium in as little as nine months from now. This timetable will shrink as more 20%-enriched uranium is produced. Once Iran reaches 960 kg., potential breakout time will be measured in weeks rather than months. Simon Henderson is director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, formerly served as deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA.2012-10-24 00:00:00Full Article
Nuclear Iran: Technical Issues Overshadowing Negotiations
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Simon Henderson and Olli Heinonen - International diplomacy concerning Iran's nuclear program centers on the regime's lack of compliance with agreements it has signed to ensure that peaceful nuclear work is not used as a cover for weapons development. Iran's current 20%-enrichment level sounds a long way from the 90% needed for a bomb, but this is not the case. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to explain why in the drawing he displayed during his September UN address. In fact, most of the work of producing weapons-grade material has already been done once 20% is reached. The problem in allowing Iran to continue any enrichment work without a clear indication that it has given up nuclear military ambitions is twofold. First, its competence with centrifuge technology will likely improve, and second, it will eventually develop improved centrifuges to replace its existing low-efficiency machines, allowing it to rapidly produce larger quantities of weapons-grade material. Iran already has 240 kg. of 20%-enriched uranium - an amount that, if further enriched, could produce a simple atomic bomb (in IAEA jargon, a "significant quantity.") Although some of its uranium stock has been made into fuel plates for a research reactor, this material could be converted back to centrifuge feedstock within a few months. Accordingly, current estimates indicate that Iran could produce up to four "significant quantities" of weapons-grade uranium in as little as nine months from now. This timetable will shrink as more 20%-enriched uranium is produced. Once Iran reaches 960 kg., potential breakout time will be measured in weeks rather than months. Simon Henderson is director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. Olli Heinonen, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, formerly served as deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA.2012-10-24 00:00:00Full Article
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