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- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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- Daily Alert
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- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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(Institute for Science and International Security) David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond - The U.S. and the international community should prepare for the possibility that Iran may officially announce that it has decided to make highly-enriched uranium, including enriching up to 60%, under a civilian or naval nuclear rationale. The production of 60%-enriched uranium would put Iran significantly closer to having weapon-grade uranium (WGU, a form of highly-enriched uranium that is enriched to 90% or more), compared to its current stockpile of 19.75%-enriched uranium, and would significantly shorten the amount of time Iran would need in a breakout scenario. Moreover, Iran does not require 60%-enriched uranium. The production of highly-enriched uranium would be an important precedent, which Iran could later use to justify the production of weapon-grade uranium.2012-10-26 00:00:00Full Article
Discouraging Any Iranian Decision to Produce Highly-Enriched Uranium
(Institute for Science and International Security) David Albright, Andrea Stricker, and Christina Walrond - The U.S. and the international community should prepare for the possibility that Iran may officially announce that it has decided to make highly-enriched uranium, including enriching up to 60%, under a civilian or naval nuclear rationale. The production of 60%-enriched uranium would put Iran significantly closer to having weapon-grade uranium (WGU, a form of highly-enriched uranium that is enriched to 90% or more), compared to its current stockpile of 19.75%-enriched uranium, and would significantly shorten the amount of time Iran would need in a breakout scenario. Moreover, Iran does not require 60%-enriched uranium. The production of highly-enriched uranium would be an important precedent, which Iran could later use to justify the production of weapon-grade uranium.2012-10-26 00:00:00Full Article
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