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(Commentary) Elliott Abrams - In May 2007, Mossad chief Meir Dagan came to the White House and showed us intelligence demonstrating that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor whose design was supplied by North Korea. Our own intelligence confirmed the Israeli information and we found that the reactor was at an advanced construction stage, just a few months from being "hot." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued for a diplomatic option, informing the International Atomic Energy Agency and demanding immediate inspections and that Syria halt work on the reactor. If Syria refused, we would go to the UN Security Council and demand action. In the end, President Bush came down on Rice's side. On July 13, President Bush called Prime Minister Olmert and told him the U.S. was not going to take the military path; we are instead going to the UN. Olmert responded: We told you from the first day, when Dagan came to Washington, that the reactor had to go away. Israel cannot live with a Syrian nuclear reactor; our national security cannot accept it. You are telling me you will not act; so we will act. I sat in the Oval Office, listening to his conversation with Olmert. Bush heard Olmert out calmly and acknowledged that Israel had a right to protect its national security. He instructed us all to abandon the diplomatic plans and maintain absolute silence, ensuring that Israel could carry out its plan. This incident is a reminder that there is no substitute for military strength and the will to use it. Think of how much more dangerous to the entire region the Syrian civil war would be today if Assad had a nuclear reactor, and even perhaps nuclear weapons, in hand. Israel was right in believing that it, and the U.S., would be better off after this assertion of leadership and determination. That lesson must be on the minds of Israeli, and American, leaders in 2013. The writer served on the U.S. National Security Council from 2001 to 2009. 2013-02-08 00:00:00Full Article
Bombing the Syrian Reactor: The Untold Story
(Commentary) Elliott Abrams - In May 2007, Mossad chief Meir Dagan came to the White House and showed us intelligence demonstrating that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor whose design was supplied by North Korea. Our own intelligence confirmed the Israeli information and we found that the reactor was at an advanced construction stage, just a few months from being "hot." Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argued for a diplomatic option, informing the International Atomic Energy Agency and demanding immediate inspections and that Syria halt work on the reactor. If Syria refused, we would go to the UN Security Council and demand action. In the end, President Bush came down on Rice's side. On July 13, President Bush called Prime Minister Olmert and told him the U.S. was not going to take the military path; we are instead going to the UN. Olmert responded: We told you from the first day, when Dagan came to Washington, that the reactor had to go away. Israel cannot live with a Syrian nuclear reactor; our national security cannot accept it. You are telling me you will not act; so we will act. I sat in the Oval Office, listening to his conversation with Olmert. Bush heard Olmert out calmly and acknowledged that Israel had a right to protect its national security. He instructed us all to abandon the diplomatic plans and maintain absolute silence, ensuring that Israel could carry out its plan. This incident is a reminder that there is no substitute for military strength and the will to use it. Think of how much more dangerous to the entire region the Syrian civil war would be today if Assad had a nuclear reactor, and even perhaps nuclear weapons, in hand. Israel was right in believing that it, and the U.S., would be better off after this assertion of leadership and determination. That lesson must be on the minds of Israeli, and American, leaders in 2013. The writer served on the U.S. National Security Council from 2001 to 2009. 2013-02-08 00:00:00Full Article
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