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- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
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- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
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Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
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- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Yiftah Shapir - Why would Syria move weapons to Hizbullah precisely when its army is in the midst of heavy fighting on Syrian territory? A likely possibility is that the Syrian army is transferring to Hizbullah systems that it does not immediately need for its fighting against the rebels, but which it is interested in keeping on Lebanese territory, where it is safer from rebel attacks. This could explain the transfer of Scud missiles, which are complicated to operate and require a large force; it is difficult to imagine that Hizbullah has the wherewithal to operate these systems. It could also explain the transfer of air defense systems: since the rebels do not have an air force. Advanced air defense systems in Lebanon would undoubtedly constitute a serious problem for Israel. The Israel Air Force (IAF) operates relatively freely over Lebanon today, gathering intelligence about both Lebanon and Syria. Until now, Hizbullah has apparently had very limited ability to interfere with this activity. The appearance of air defense systems such as the SA-17 is undoubtedly a red line for Israel, since their presence will make it difficult for the IAF to carry out most of its missions. Another possible danger is the appearance of Bastion anti-ship missiles in Lebanon. The system could endanger ships and coastal installations along the entire coast of Israel if deployed from Lebanon. Its entry into Lebanese territory would certainly constitute a red line for Israel. The writer is a senior research fellow at INSS.2013-02-15 00:00:00Full Article
Syrian Weapons in Hizbullah Hands
(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Yiftah Shapir - Why would Syria move weapons to Hizbullah precisely when its army is in the midst of heavy fighting on Syrian territory? A likely possibility is that the Syrian army is transferring to Hizbullah systems that it does not immediately need for its fighting against the rebels, but which it is interested in keeping on Lebanese territory, where it is safer from rebel attacks. This could explain the transfer of Scud missiles, which are complicated to operate and require a large force; it is difficult to imagine that Hizbullah has the wherewithal to operate these systems. It could also explain the transfer of air defense systems: since the rebels do not have an air force. Advanced air defense systems in Lebanon would undoubtedly constitute a serious problem for Israel. The Israel Air Force (IAF) operates relatively freely over Lebanon today, gathering intelligence about both Lebanon and Syria. Until now, Hizbullah has apparently had very limited ability to interfere with this activity. The appearance of air defense systems such as the SA-17 is undoubtedly a red line for Israel, since their presence will make it difficult for the IAF to carry out most of its missions. Another possible danger is the appearance of Bastion anti-ship missiles in Lebanon. The system could endanger ships and coastal installations along the entire coast of Israel if deployed from Lebanon. Its entry into Lebanese territory would certainly constitute a red line for Israel. The writer is a senior research fellow at INSS.2013-02-15 00:00:00Full Article
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