Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Wall Street Journal) David Feith - In the fall of 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency deputy director-general Olli Heinonen was in his office in Vienna when a man appeared claiming that Iran was replicating its existing uranium-enrichment facility in an underground site near Qum. And so it was, as the IAEA and Western spy agencies later confirmed. Also under construction in Iran, he said, was a duplicate of the Arak heavy-water facility designed to produce plutonium. In other words, he said that Iran had at least two secret sites, and he was correct on the first. What about the second - is there a plutonium facility that remains secret today? Heinonen explains that Iran might be past the nuclear point of no return and that Iran's breakout would likely outpace the ability of the "international community" to respond. Heinonen's implication is that an Iranian bomb is now simply a matter of Tehran's will, not capability - despite two decades of international effort to prevent it. Short of military force, there is only so much that outsiders can do to stop a determined regime. 2013-03-04 00:00:00Full Article
How Iran Went Nuclear - Interview with Veteran Weapons Inspector Olli Heinonen
(Wall Street Journal) David Feith - In the fall of 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency deputy director-general Olli Heinonen was in his office in Vienna when a man appeared claiming that Iran was replicating its existing uranium-enrichment facility in an underground site near Qum. And so it was, as the IAEA and Western spy agencies later confirmed. Also under construction in Iran, he said, was a duplicate of the Arak heavy-water facility designed to produce plutonium. In other words, he said that Iran had at least two secret sites, and he was correct on the first. What about the second - is there a plutonium facility that remains secret today? Heinonen explains that Iran might be past the nuclear point of no return and that Iran's breakout would likely outpace the ability of the "international community" to respond. Heinonen's implication is that an Iranian bomb is now simply a matter of Tehran's will, not capability - despite two decades of international effort to prevent it. Short of military force, there is only so much that outsiders can do to stop a determined regime. 2013-03-04 00:00:00Full Article
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