Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jerusalem Post) Herb Keinon - Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the UN, said that the relationship between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu "started off on the wrong foot" four years ago due to "assumptions that were moving in the political systems of both countries." One of the assumptions in Washington, Gold said, was that the sides were just a hairbreadth away from an agreement, and with just a little push they could be pushed over the ledge to an agreement. When Netanyahu met Obama in the Oval Office in May 2009, the president linked Iran and the Palestinian issue, saying that progress on the Palestinian track would make it easier to enlist the Arab world in getting behind efforts to stop Iran. Netanyahu took the opposite approach: First, neutralize Iran's nuclear program - thereby dismissing Tehran's ability to gain hegemony in the region - and then it will be much easier to deal with the Palestinians. As long as Iran felt that it was riding high in the saddle in the region, it would never let a diplomatic process get off the ground, and it had two players it could send onto the field to gum up the works whenever it wanted: Hamas and Hizbullah. There was another major conceptual difference regarding the Palestinians. Obama, at the time, was under the sway of those who felt that if Israel would just give a little more, concede a little more land, then peace would be attainable. Netanyahu, however, said the land for peace equation never worked in the past - not in Lebanon, nor in Gaza - and there was no reason to believe it would work now. As time passed and reality began to bite, the gaps in these conceptual differences began to narrow. Few in the administration still believe that solving the Palestinian issue would impact on efforts to stop Iran, and many in Washington have been disabused of the notion that a settlement freeze will bring about gestures from the Arab world leading to a comprehensive agreement. No one is there anymore. As the conceptual gaps narrowed, the tensions between the two governments lessened. 2013-03-20 00:00:00Full Article
Obama's Visit to Reset Relations with Israel
(Jerusalem Post) Herb Keinon - Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the UN, said that the relationship between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu "started off on the wrong foot" four years ago due to "assumptions that were moving in the political systems of both countries." One of the assumptions in Washington, Gold said, was that the sides were just a hairbreadth away from an agreement, and with just a little push they could be pushed over the ledge to an agreement. When Netanyahu met Obama in the Oval Office in May 2009, the president linked Iran and the Palestinian issue, saying that progress on the Palestinian track would make it easier to enlist the Arab world in getting behind efforts to stop Iran. Netanyahu took the opposite approach: First, neutralize Iran's nuclear program - thereby dismissing Tehran's ability to gain hegemony in the region - and then it will be much easier to deal with the Palestinians. As long as Iran felt that it was riding high in the saddle in the region, it would never let a diplomatic process get off the ground, and it had two players it could send onto the field to gum up the works whenever it wanted: Hamas and Hizbullah. There was another major conceptual difference regarding the Palestinians. Obama, at the time, was under the sway of those who felt that if Israel would just give a little more, concede a little more land, then peace would be attainable. Netanyahu, however, said the land for peace equation never worked in the past - not in Lebanon, nor in Gaza - and there was no reason to believe it would work now. As time passed and reality began to bite, the gaps in these conceptual differences began to narrow. Few in the administration still believe that solving the Palestinian issue would impact on efforts to stop Iran, and many in Washington have been disabused of the notion that a settlement freeze will bring about gestures from the Arab world leading to a comprehensive agreement. No one is there anymore. As the conceptual gaps narrowed, the tensions between the two governments lessened. 2013-03-20 00:00:00Full Article
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