Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Post) Ray Takeyh - Iran's path to the bomb is contingent on its ability to produce vast quantities of low-enriched uranium while introducing a new generation of high-velocity centrifuges. Both are being produced at an unimpeded pace at the Natanz enrichment plant. The lax nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's basic inspection regime makes it an unreliable guide to detecting persistent diversion of small quantities of fuel from an industrial-size installation. Meanwhile, Iran's mastery of advanced centrifuges will give it the ability to build secret installations that can quickly enrich uranium to weapons-grade quality. Iran's problem all along has been that its illicit nuclear activities were detected before it could assemble such a surge capacity. To mitigate this danger, Iranian diplomats insist that the West recognize its right to enrich, in order to give Iran's nuclear apparatus legal cover. It is more justifiable for the U.S. or Israel to bomb illegal Iranian installations than those legitimized by all the permanent members of the Security Council. The best means of disarming Iran is to insist on a simple and basic red line: Iran must adhere to all the Security Council resolutions pertaining to its nuclear infractions. The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 2013-04-02 00:00:00Full Article
The Best Red Line for a Nuclear Iran
(Washington Post) Ray Takeyh - Iran's path to the bomb is contingent on its ability to produce vast quantities of low-enriched uranium while introducing a new generation of high-velocity centrifuges. Both are being produced at an unimpeded pace at the Natanz enrichment plant. The lax nature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's basic inspection regime makes it an unreliable guide to detecting persistent diversion of small quantities of fuel from an industrial-size installation. Meanwhile, Iran's mastery of advanced centrifuges will give it the ability to build secret installations that can quickly enrich uranium to weapons-grade quality. Iran's problem all along has been that its illicit nuclear activities were detected before it could assemble such a surge capacity. To mitigate this danger, Iranian diplomats insist that the West recognize its right to enrich, in order to give Iran's nuclear apparatus legal cover. It is more justifiable for the U.S. or Israel to bomb illegal Iranian installations than those legitimized by all the permanent members of the Security Council. The best means of disarming Iran is to insist on a simple and basic red line: Iran must adhere to all the Security Council resolutions pertaining to its nuclear infractions. The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. 2013-04-02 00:00:00Full Article
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