Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Michael Eisenstadt - Russian officials recently announced that the first reactor at Bushehr (Unit I) may be completed this year. Although not ideally suited for the purpose, Bushehr could become a source of plutonium for weapons. For example, during a protracted crisis or war, Tehran could run the reactor at economically inefficient low fuel burn-up levels to produce weapons-grade plutonium or, alternately, separate reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel awaiting reshipment to Russia. Although reactor-grade plutonium is not ideal for bombmaking (radioactivity makes it dangerous to work with, while its isotopic composition makes for an inefficient and unreliable weapon), the U.S. demonstrated the military utility of such plutonium in a 1962 underground nuclear explosive test. Iran could produce plutonium by 2005. Weaponization could take another six to twelve months.2003-02-13 00:00:00Full Article
Iran's Nuclear Program: Gathering Dust or Gaining Steam?
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Michael Eisenstadt - Russian officials recently announced that the first reactor at Bushehr (Unit I) may be completed this year. Although not ideally suited for the purpose, Bushehr could become a source of plutonium for weapons. For example, during a protracted crisis or war, Tehran could run the reactor at economically inefficient low fuel burn-up levels to produce weapons-grade plutonium or, alternately, separate reactor-grade plutonium from spent fuel awaiting reshipment to Russia. Although reactor-grade plutonium is not ideal for bombmaking (radioactivity makes it dangerous to work with, while its isotopic composition makes for an inefficient and unreliable weapon), the U.S. demonstrated the military utility of such plutonium in a 1962 underground nuclear explosive test. Iran could produce plutonium by 2005. Weaponization could take another six to twelve months.2003-02-13 00:00:00Full Article
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