Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(GLORIA Center-IDC Herzliya) Norvell B. DeAtkine - The demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies in conventional warfare does not apply to the parameters of unconventional warfare, where insurgents displayed initiative and imagination. A number of factors account for this difference. The Arab guerilla usually had leadership sharpened by battle as well as experience and exuded the confidence that motivated others to follow him - as opposed to a conventional unit commander most likely picked by the regime for political reasons. Moreover, the Arab guerilla was apt to be with those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe. The unconventional Arab soldier is fighting within his element with people he trusts. The malaise within the Arab culture requires solutions from within, and attempts to graft Western culture onto Arab society have failed. Some have seen the reserved response of the militaries in Tunisia and Egypt toward demonstrators as a consequence of U.S. and Western influence. Unfortunately this has little validity. It was far more a result of military leaders correctly assessing where their best interests lie. Imparting Western values and soldierly ethos to the Arab armies has been, as someone once observed, like teaching dance steps without the music. They memorize the steps but never get the tempo or the rhythm of Western military traditions. U.S. Army Col. Norvell B. DeAtkine, an Arab specialist, was Director of Middle East Studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He has dealt with Arab militaries for over 40 years. 2013-04-19 00:00:00Full Article
Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Roles
(GLORIA Center-IDC Herzliya) Norvell B. DeAtkine - The demonstrated ineffectiveness of Arab armies in conventional warfare does not apply to the parameters of unconventional warfare, where insurgents displayed initiative and imagination. A number of factors account for this difference. The Arab guerilla usually had leadership sharpened by battle as well as experience and exuded the confidence that motivated others to follow him - as opposed to a conventional unit commander most likely picked by the regime for political reasons. Moreover, the Arab guerilla was apt to be with those of his own ethnic group, clan, or tribe. The unconventional Arab soldier is fighting within his element with people he trusts. The malaise within the Arab culture requires solutions from within, and attempts to graft Western culture onto Arab society have failed. Some have seen the reserved response of the militaries in Tunisia and Egypt toward demonstrators as a consequence of U.S. and Western influence. Unfortunately this has little validity. It was far more a result of military leaders correctly assessing where their best interests lie. Imparting Western values and soldierly ethos to the Arab armies has been, as someone once observed, like teaching dance steps without the music. They memorize the steps but never get the tempo or the rhythm of Western military traditions. U.S. Army Col. Norvell B. DeAtkine, an Arab specialist, was Director of Middle East Studies at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He has dealt with Arab militaries for over 40 years. 2013-04-19 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|