Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Independent-UK) - Lawrence Freedman It has become an article of faith in the U.S. Air Force that a well-designed air campaign can undermine an enemy state. Yet attacking buildings proved essentially irrelevant. The sources of the Iraqi regime's power lay in its networks of patronage and terror. In 1991, the Iraqis evacuated the relevant buildings of anything important, including key personnel, and moved into buildings normally used for more innocent pursuits. Saddam's well-developed survival instincts had him moving around the residential suburbs of Baghdad during the Allied bombing. Many of those who have done Saddam's bidding in the past will be looking anxiously for the right moment to jump ship. It would be best if they were to do so when coalition forces are close at hand. This would ensure that no power vacuum develops, public order can be maintained, and basic human needs met. 2003-03-24 00:00:00Full Article
Lessons from the Bombing of Baghdad, 1991
(Independent-UK) - Lawrence Freedman It has become an article of faith in the U.S. Air Force that a well-designed air campaign can undermine an enemy state. Yet attacking buildings proved essentially irrelevant. The sources of the Iraqi regime's power lay in its networks of patronage and terror. In 1991, the Iraqis evacuated the relevant buildings of anything important, including key personnel, and moved into buildings normally used for more innocent pursuits. Saddam's well-developed survival instincts had him moving around the residential suburbs of Baghdad during the Allied bombing. Many of those who have done Saddam's bidding in the past will be looking anxiously for the right moment to jump ship. It would be best if they were to do so when coalition forces are close at hand. This would ensure that no power vacuum develops, public order can be maintained, and basic human needs met. 2003-03-24 00:00:00Full Article
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