Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Washington Post) - Rolf Ekeus During its war against Iran, Iraq found that chemical warfare agents, especially nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun, and later VX, deteriorated after just a couple of weeks' storage in drums or in filled chemical warfare munitions. Thus, the Iraqi policy after the Gulf War was to halt all production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war. The combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques, and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat - its chemical weapon. Iraq's biological weapons program, and specifically its now-unemployed specialists, constitute a potential threat of much the same magnitude. The writer was executive chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997. 2003-07-01 00:00:00Full Article
Iraq's Real Weapons Threat
(Washington Post) - Rolf Ekeus During its war against Iran, Iraq found that chemical warfare agents, especially nerve agents such as sarin, soman, tabun, and later VX, deteriorated after just a couple of weeks' storage in drums or in filled chemical warfare munitions. Thus, the Iraqi policy after the Gulf War was to halt all production of warfare agents and to focus on design and engineering, with the purpose of activating production and shipping of warfare agents and munitions directly to the battlefield in the event of war. The combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques, and testing is what constituted Iraq's chemical threat - its chemical weapon. Iraq's biological weapons program, and specifically its now-unemployed specialists, constitute a potential threat of much the same magnitude. The writer was executive chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997. 2003-07-01 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|