Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
Washington Post) - The U.S. intelligence community "failed to fully capitalize" on information that might have allowed agents to unravel the hijack plot and bungled clues that should have led the FBI to two or more of the terrorists before they could act, according to a partially declassified investigation by the joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence released Thursday. The report paints a picture of a poorly organized, understaffed, and sometimes half-hearted effort, in agencies across the government, that missed the warning signs and failed to add up the clues. In particular, the report raises questions about the role of several men who aided hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who moved to San Diego after attending a January 2000 al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where the attacks may have been planned. The two hijacked and crashed an American Airlines plane into the Pentagon. They were befriended in California by a Saudi, Omar Bayoumi, an employee of the Saudi civil aviation authority who had been the subject of a counterterrorism investigation begun in 1998. Bayoumi, who had large amounts of cash from Saudi Arabia, put down a security deposit and first month's rent on an apartment for the conspirators and set them up with a translator, a man whose brother is the subject of a counterterrorism investigation. After Sept. 11, the FBI found that Bayoumi "has connections to terrorist elements," including ties to al Qaeda, the report said. The FBI also determined that another Saudi who had befriended the San Diego hijackers, Osama Bassnan, "is an extremist and a bin Laden supporter." The FBI was aware that in 1993 Bassnan hosted a party in Washington for Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind cleric now imprisoned for his role in the first World Trade Center attack. Bassnan and his family received charitable support from Princess Haifa al-Faisal, wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Passages that were declassified portray the Saudi government as uncooperative in the fight against terrorism both before and after Sept. 11. 2003-07-25 00:00:00Full Article
Hill's 9/11 Probe Finds Multiple Failures
Washington Post) - The U.S. intelligence community "failed to fully capitalize" on information that might have allowed agents to unravel the hijack plot and bungled clues that should have led the FBI to two or more of the terrorists before they could act, according to a partially declassified investigation by the joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence released Thursday. The report paints a picture of a poorly organized, understaffed, and sometimes half-hearted effort, in agencies across the government, that missed the warning signs and failed to add up the clues. In particular, the report raises questions about the role of several men who aided hijackers Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi, who moved to San Diego after attending a January 2000 al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where the attacks may have been planned. The two hijacked and crashed an American Airlines plane into the Pentagon. They were befriended in California by a Saudi, Omar Bayoumi, an employee of the Saudi civil aviation authority who had been the subject of a counterterrorism investigation begun in 1998. Bayoumi, who had large amounts of cash from Saudi Arabia, put down a security deposit and first month's rent on an apartment for the conspirators and set them up with a translator, a man whose brother is the subject of a counterterrorism investigation. After Sept. 11, the FBI found that Bayoumi "has connections to terrorist elements," including ties to al Qaeda, the report said. The FBI also determined that another Saudi who had befriended the San Diego hijackers, Osama Bassnan, "is an extremist and a bin Laden supporter." The FBI was aware that in 1993 Bassnan hosted a party in Washington for Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind cleric now imprisoned for his role in the first World Trade Center attack. Bassnan and his family received charitable support from Princess Haifa al-Faisal, wife of Saudi Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Passages that were declassified portray the Saudi government as uncooperative in the fight against terrorism both before and after Sept. 11. 2003-07-25 00:00:00Full Article
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