Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Ha'aretz) Uzi Benziman - The attack in Jerusalem was a turning point in the road map. The number of casualties and their demographic composition (ultra-Orthodox, infants and children, evoking images of pogroms from the exilic period) translated into a demand for an operation that would leave a lasting impression on the Palestinian public. The security cabinet gave Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas more than 24 hours to take action against the leaders of Hamas, but that expectation did not materialize. Dahlan told the Israelis that he needs the cooperation of the security units controlled by Arafat in order to move against Hamas. But Arafat declined to cooperate. The reaction by the IDF is intended to deal a blow to the terrorist organizations and demonstrate to the Palestinian leadership that Israel will act in its place against terrorism, but at the same time not burn the bridges. Two days after the bus bombing, the word in Sharon's vicinity was that the process of dialogue with Abbas and his group has not reached its final stage and that the common interest of all the sides is to persist in it, and that therefore the process is still alive. The Israeli decision to focus its military reaction on Hamas seemed to indicate an intention to settle accounts with the main organization that is taking Israeli lives and also undermining the (declared) will of Abu Mazen to reach an agreement with Israel. Implicit in the Israeli decision is a message to the Palestinians and to the world: Israel is taking action where the Palestinian leadership should be taking action. Israel is no longer ready to bear the consequences of murderous Hamas activity or the failures of the Palestinian government. Once it concludes its operation against Hamas, Israel will be ready to renew the dialogue with the PA leadership. Hamas is not a partner for an agreement with Israel. It is part of the world of terrorism and both its military wing and its political infrastructure must be eradicated. After it loses its status, moderate forces may arise within Palestinian society with whom it will be possible to reach an agreement. Hovering over the character of the Israeli response was the lesson of Oslo, as it is understood by the current leadership in Jerusalem (and on this point, by the previous leadership as well): there must be no restraint in the face of violations of agreements in the security sphere. Every breakdown in this sphere must be reacted to by exacting a price that will make it plain to the other side that it will be best for them to maintain the agreement.2003-08-22 00:00:00Full Article
Turning Point in the Road Map
(Ha'aretz) Uzi Benziman - The attack in Jerusalem was a turning point in the road map. The number of casualties and their demographic composition (ultra-Orthodox, infants and children, evoking images of pogroms from the exilic period) translated into a demand for an operation that would leave a lasting impression on the Palestinian public. The security cabinet gave Palestinian prime minister Mahmoud Abbas more than 24 hours to take action against the leaders of Hamas, but that expectation did not materialize. Dahlan told the Israelis that he needs the cooperation of the security units controlled by Arafat in order to move against Hamas. But Arafat declined to cooperate. The reaction by the IDF is intended to deal a blow to the terrorist organizations and demonstrate to the Palestinian leadership that Israel will act in its place against terrorism, but at the same time not burn the bridges. Two days after the bus bombing, the word in Sharon's vicinity was that the process of dialogue with Abbas and his group has not reached its final stage and that the common interest of all the sides is to persist in it, and that therefore the process is still alive. The Israeli decision to focus its military reaction on Hamas seemed to indicate an intention to settle accounts with the main organization that is taking Israeli lives and also undermining the (declared) will of Abu Mazen to reach an agreement with Israel. Implicit in the Israeli decision is a message to the Palestinians and to the world: Israel is taking action where the Palestinian leadership should be taking action. Israel is no longer ready to bear the consequences of murderous Hamas activity or the failures of the Palestinian government. Once it concludes its operation against Hamas, Israel will be ready to renew the dialogue with the PA leadership. Hamas is not a partner for an agreement with Israel. It is part of the world of terrorism and both its military wing and its political infrastructure must be eradicated. After it loses its status, moderate forces may arise within Palestinian society with whom it will be possible to reach an agreement. Hovering over the character of the Israeli response was the lesson of Oslo, as it is understood by the current leadership in Jerusalem (and on this point, by the previous leadership as well): there must be no restraint in the face of violations of agreements in the security sphere. Every breakdown in this sphere must be reacted to by exacting a price that will make it plain to the other side that it will be best for them to maintain the agreement.2003-08-22 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|