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Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
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- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(IAEA) Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 6, 2003 - • During the regular session of the IAEA General Conference in September 2002, ElBaradei met with the Vice President of Iran who is president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, R. Aghazadeh. • ElBaradei asked that Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear-related facility at Natanz. Aghazadeh agreed to an IAEA visit that took place in February 2003. • During his visit, ElBaradei was informed by Iran of its nuclear enrichment program which included two new facilities located at Natanz, including a pilot fuel enrichment program, nearing completion, and a large commercial-scale fuel-enrichment plant, under construction. Since March 2003, IAEA inspectors have visited Natanz three times and taken environmental samples. • IAEA found that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material. It failed to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991 and its subsequent transfer for further processing. So far the quantity of nuclear material is not large and it would need further processing before being suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device. • ElBaradei encouraged Iran to conclude an additional protocol, without which IAEA's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. 2003-08-27 00:00:00Full Article
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(IAEA) Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, June 6, 2003 - • During the regular session of the IAEA General Conference in September 2002, ElBaradei met with the Vice President of Iran who is president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, R. Aghazadeh. • ElBaradei asked that Iran confirm whether it was building a large underground nuclear-related facility at Natanz. Aghazadeh agreed to an IAEA visit that took place in February 2003. • During his visit, ElBaradei was informed by Iran of its nuclear enrichment program which included two new facilities located at Natanz, including a pilot fuel enrichment program, nearing completion, and a large commercial-scale fuel-enrichment plant, under construction. Since March 2003, IAEA inspectors have visited Natanz three times and taken environmental samples. • IAEA found that Iran failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material. It failed to declare the import of natural uranium in 1991 and its subsequent transfer for further processing. So far the quantity of nuclear material is not large and it would need further processing before being suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device. • ElBaradei encouraged Iran to conclude an additional protocol, without which IAEA's ability to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities is limited. 2003-08-27 00:00:00Full Article
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