Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(JTA) Dore Gold - After 10 years it’s clear that the failure to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement cannot be attributed to a lack of political will on the Israeli side. Rather, it has to do with the more fundamental question of whether the leadership of the PLO really was prepared for reconciliation and peace with Israel. The overwhelming evidence is that the PLO leadership viewed the Oslo process as a tactical necessity to realize its ultimate strategic goal of "Palestine from the river to the sea” - including Israel. The problem is deeper than Arafat. On two occasions in 2001, Faisal Husseini confessed that the Oslo agreements were nothing more than a "Trojan Horse" for realizing the eventual eradication of Israel. West Bank Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti told the New Yorker that even if Israel withdrew from 100% of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not end. Why did the Israeli and U.S. governments invest so much in the Oslo process if it was so clear that the PLO had no intention of making peace? Didn’t they consult with their intelligence establishments? Henry Kissinger warned in his book, Diplomacy: “What political leaders decide, intelligence services tend to seek to justify.” Governments must allow their intelligence communities the freedom to express themselves and promote intellectual pluralism if disasters in the Middle East are to be avoided.2003-09-09 00:00:00Full Article
Ten Years After Oslo - Three Views
(JTA) Dore Gold - After 10 years it’s clear that the failure to reach an Israeli-Palestinian agreement cannot be attributed to a lack of political will on the Israeli side. Rather, it has to do with the more fundamental question of whether the leadership of the PLO really was prepared for reconciliation and peace with Israel. The overwhelming evidence is that the PLO leadership viewed the Oslo process as a tactical necessity to realize its ultimate strategic goal of "Palestine from the river to the sea” - including Israel. The problem is deeper than Arafat. On two occasions in 2001, Faisal Husseini confessed that the Oslo agreements were nothing more than a "Trojan Horse" for realizing the eventual eradication of Israel. West Bank Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti told the New Yorker that even if Israel withdrew from 100% of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not end. Why did the Israeli and U.S. governments invest so much in the Oslo process if it was so clear that the PLO had no intention of making peace? Didn’t they consult with their intelligence establishments? Henry Kissinger warned in his book, Diplomacy: “What political leaders decide, intelligence services tend to seek to justify.” Governments must allow their intelligence communities the freedom to express themselves and promote intellectual pluralism if disasters in the Middle East are to be avoided.2003-09-09 00:00:00Full Article
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