Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Post) Charles Krauthammer - On the reconstruction of Iraq, everybody knows exactly how it should have been done. One major mistake was disbanding the Iraqi army, though at the time, it seemed the right thing to do. Keeping Hussein's army risked a future Baathist return to power. For the long-run health of the new Iraq, it made eminent sense to abolish the army and start over. Yet the challenge in the short run is putting down Sunni Triangle resistance. Had we retained the old army, we might have had ready-made military units suitable at least for guarding stationary targets such as oil pipelines. Moreover, dissolution of the Baathist army released a large population of unemployed, disgruntled, and weapons-trained young men, some undoubtedly shooting at our troops. The undramatic story is that Iraq is producing more than 1.6 million barrels a day, more than three-quarters of 2002 production levels. Last week OPEC unexpectedly cut its production quotas - boosting oil prices and rattling world markets - because it sees Iraqi oil production coming on line and seriously threatening world prices. 2003-10-03 00:00:00Full Article
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(Washington Post) Charles Krauthammer - On the reconstruction of Iraq, everybody knows exactly how it should have been done. One major mistake was disbanding the Iraqi army, though at the time, it seemed the right thing to do. Keeping Hussein's army risked a future Baathist return to power. For the long-run health of the new Iraq, it made eminent sense to abolish the army and start over. Yet the challenge in the short run is putting down Sunni Triangle resistance. Had we retained the old army, we might have had ready-made military units suitable at least for guarding stationary targets such as oil pipelines. Moreover, dissolution of the Baathist army released a large population of unemployed, disgruntled, and weapons-trained young men, some undoubtedly shooting at our troops. The undramatic story is that Iraq is producing more than 1.6 million barrels a day, more than three-quarters of 2002 production levels. Last week OPEC unexpectedly cut its production quotas - boosting oil prices and rattling world markets - because it sees Iraqi oil production coming on line and seriously threatening world prices. 2003-10-03 00:00:00Full Article
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