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Media:
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Brig. Gen. Eival Gilady, head of the IDF Strategic Planning Branch, speaking at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: When Yasser Arafat unleashed terrorist violence against Israel in September 2000, he was applying mistaken lessons from the conflicts in Lebanon and Kosovo. In Lebanon, Arafat witnessed Israeli public reaction to the average loss of 25 IDF soldiers annually. In Kosovo, Arafat saw a small minority of Moslems, the Albanians, bring in the whole world to intervene -- not only politically but also militarily. An Israeli counterstrategy of restraint sought to minimize the number of casualties not only on our side but also on the Palestinian side as well. Arafat’s Fatah organization is responsible for 42 percent of the attacks; Hamas 39 percent; Palestinian Islamic Jihad 9 percent; and the PFLP 3 percent. Most of the terror activities of the last few months were carried out by Fatah. If the katyusha rockets on the Karine-A weapons ship had reached the Palestinians, most of Israel’s population centers would be within their range. "Just imagine millions of people in Tel Aviv or Netanya or Hadera or Beer Sheva living in shelters, not being able to send their kids to school or go to work." After Operation Defensive Shield, we found evidence that the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority was personally involved in supporting, funding, encouraging, and knowing of terrorist actions against us. Terrorist attacks originating in Jenin killed 93 Israelis and wounded over 640 during the last 18 months. In the fighting in Jenin, the reason why we did not use artillery was not because there was outside pressure or because of world public opinion. It is because of Israeli norms and values. The IDF will never do something that Israeli society will not accept. We pushed more food trucks into Jenin than usually reach the city each month in order to be sure that there was no hunger. We brought oxygen and generators to the local hospital. We offered blood, but they didn't want our blood, so we allowed our colleagues, the Jordanians, to fly in blood.2002-06-20 00:00:00Full Article
Why Arafat Went to War
Brig. Gen. Eival Gilady, head of the IDF Strategic Planning Branch, speaking at the Institute for Contemporary Affairs of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs: When Yasser Arafat unleashed terrorist violence against Israel in September 2000, he was applying mistaken lessons from the conflicts in Lebanon and Kosovo. In Lebanon, Arafat witnessed Israeli public reaction to the average loss of 25 IDF soldiers annually. In Kosovo, Arafat saw a small minority of Moslems, the Albanians, bring in the whole world to intervene -- not only politically but also militarily. An Israeli counterstrategy of restraint sought to minimize the number of casualties not only on our side but also on the Palestinian side as well. Arafat’s Fatah organization is responsible for 42 percent of the attacks; Hamas 39 percent; Palestinian Islamic Jihad 9 percent; and the PFLP 3 percent. Most of the terror activities of the last few months were carried out by Fatah. If the katyusha rockets on the Karine-A weapons ship had reached the Palestinians, most of Israel’s population centers would be within their range. "Just imagine millions of people in Tel Aviv or Netanya or Hadera or Beer Sheva living in shelters, not being able to send their kids to school or go to work." After Operation Defensive Shield, we found evidence that the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority was personally involved in supporting, funding, encouraging, and knowing of terrorist actions against us. Terrorist attacks originating in Jenin killed 93 Israelis and wounded over 640 during the last 18 months. In the fighting in Jenin, the reason why we did not use artillery was not because there was outside pressure or because of world public opinion. It is because of Israeli norms and values. The IDF will never do something that Israeli society will not accept. We pushed more food trucks into Jenin than usually reach the city each month in order to be sure that there was no hunger. We brought oxygen and generators to the local hospital. We offered blood, but they didn't want our blood, so we allowed our colleagues, the Jordanians, to fly in blood.2002-06-20 00:00:00Full Article
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