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(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/JCPA) Ehud Ya'ari - On the very day that the Oslo agreements were implemented and Arafat arrived at the Rafah terminal in Gaza in peace and euphoria, a young Israeli soldier looked into the car and then remarked to his comrade: "Gee, I didn't know Arafat was so tall." Arafat's kaffiyah was scraping the ceiling, and in a Mercedes you have to be an NBA player for that to happen. It turned out that Arafat was sitting on somebody whom he was smuggling in -- Jihad Amarin -- and Mamduh Nofal, the former military commander of the Democratic Front, was hiding in the trunk. On the night of September 28, 2000, Arafat issued orders and instructions to his political leadership and the different commanders of the security agencies to begin a wave of violence. The formal security forces were to stick to the sidelines and allow the irregulars -- the "national and Islamic forces," an alliance of Tanzim, Hamas, Jihad, and the Fronts -- to do the job. We are heading towards a system of two to four or more undeclared principalities in the territories, each controlled by a different local coalition. We have reached a point very similar to one reached after the intifada of 1936-39, called by the Palestinians "The Great Arab Revolt." At that time, the neighboring Arab states returned to the scene and made decisions on behalf of the Palestinians, whether they liked it or not, after the British killed 5,000 Palestinians and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was exiled. A basic tenet of the Oslo accord was the assumption that the Palestinian partner, Arafat, was/is interested in a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, at peace with Israel. But Arafat never intended to end his political career as the president of a mini-Palestinian state. The latest insurgency has not become a popular uprising; there is only limited participation by those living in the countryside, in the Jerusalem region, or among students. Concerns about the repercussions to the deportation of Arafat are much exaggerated. This war is not about settlements. It was never about occupation. It is about whether the Palestinian state is going to be born in peace and for peace. 2002-07-01 00:00:00Full Article
"Gee I Didn't Know Arafat Was So Tall"
(Institute for Contemporary Affairs/JCPA) Ehud Ya'ari - On the very day that the Oslo agreements were implemented and Arafat arrived at the Rafah terminal in Gaza in peace and euphoria, a young Israeli soldier looked into the car and then remarked to his comrade: "Gee, I didn't know Arafat was so tall." Arafat's kaffiyah was scraping the ceiling, and in a Mercedes you have to be an NBA player for that to happen. It turned out that Arafat was sitting on somebody whom he was smuggling in -- Jihad Amarin -- and Mamduh Nofal, the former military commander of the Democratic Front, was hiding in the trunk. On the night of September 28, 2000, Arafat issued orders and instructions to his political leadership and the different commanders of the security agencies to begin a wave of violence. The formal security forces were to stick to the sidelines and allow the irregulars -- the "national and Islamic forces," an alliance of Tanzim, Hamas, Jihad, and the Fronts -- to do the job. We are heading towards a system of two to four or more undeclared principalities in the territories, each controlled by a different local coalition. We have reached a point very similar to one reached after the intifada of 1936-39, called by the Palestinians "The Great Arab Revolt." At that time, the neighboring Arab states returned to the scene and made decisions on behalf of the Palestinians, whether they liked it or not, after the British killed 5,000 Palestinians and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem was exiled. A basic tenet of the Oslo accord was the assumption that the Palestinian partner, Arafat, was/is interested in a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, at peace with Israel. But Arafat never intended to end his political career as the president of a mini-Palestinian state. The latest insurgency has not become a popular uprising; there is only limited participation by those living in the countryside, in the Jerusalem region, or among students. Concerns about the repercussions to the deportation of Arafat are much exaggerated. This war is not about settlements. It was never about occupation. It is about whether the Palestinian state is going to be born in peace and for peace. 2002-07-01 00:00:00Full Article
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