Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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[Middle East Strategy at Harvard University] Andrew Exum - Unlike most other Arab armies since 1948, Hizbullah demonstrates a high proficiency in the maintenance and employment of its weapons systems, it performs well in small-unit light infantry operations, and it uses a decentralized command structure that allows its subordinate leaders to exercise a high degree of initiative on the battlefield. The Shia who make up Hizbullah's constituency think giving up their arms means a return to the days when the concerns of the Shia living in the south, the Bekaa Valley, and the suburbs of Beirut were largely forgotten by the central government. Furthermore, many of the young men who joined Hizbullah were lured by the promise of fighting Israel. Hizbullah must worry that if they were to abandon their military campaign against Israel, these young men would simply split off in the same way that so many of the Amal militia's gunmen left for Hizbullah in the early 1980s. In order to keep these young men under arms, it is necessary to continue some form of armed conflict against Israel. 2007-12-28 01:00:00Full Article
Learning from Hizbullah
[Middle East Strategy at Harvard University] Andrew Exum - Unlike most other Arab armies since 1948, Hizbullah demonstrates a high proficiency in the maintenance and employment of its weapons systems, it performs well in small-unit light infantry operations, and it uses a decentralized command structure that allows its subordinate leaders to exercise a high degree of initiative on the battlefield. The Shia who make up Hizbullah's constituency think giving up their arms means a return to the days when the concerns of the Shia living in the south, the Bekaa Valley, and the suburbs of Beirut were largely forgotten by the central government. Furthermore, many of the young men who joined Hizbullah were lured by the promise of fighting Israel. Hizbullah must worry that if they were to abandon their military campaign against Israel, these young men would simply split off in the same way that so many of the Amal militia's gunmen left for Hizbullah in the early 1980s. In order to keep these young men under arms, it is necessary to continue some form of armed conflict against Israel. 2007-12-28 01:00:00Full Article
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