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Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
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(Institute for National Security Studies) Emily B. Landau - To achieve nuclear rollback via negotiations, the international community will have to be armed with a considerable degree of leverage. The North Korean model demonstrates clearly what happens when a determined proliferator faces international negotiators that are devoid of any leverage for compelling it to reverse course in the nuclear realm. The experience of dealing with North Korea underscores the importance of the economic leverage that the P5+1 finally gained over Iran in 2012, following the set of strong and effective economic and financial sanctions that the U.S. and EU put in place. If this leverage is squandered in return for anything less than very significant nuclear concessions by Iran, the Iranian case will very likely begin looking more and more like North Korea, with the international community increasingly powerless to stop it. The lesson of Libya (2003) and Syria (2013) is that when pressure succeeds in forcing a state to actually make the decision to reverse course, it does not take years to finalize a deal. Indeed, the details can be worked out very quickly, and the process can begin almost immediately. Until Iran makes the strategic decision to reverse course in the nuclear realm, there is little chance that a true and lasting deal will be achieved. Keeping an eye firmly on the leverage is the only hope the P5+1 have to compel Iran to finally make that choice. The writer, a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, is also director of its Arms Control and Regional Security Project. 2013-12-03 00:00:00Full Article
A Nuclear Crisis in Search of a Model: Lessons from Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria
(Institute for National Security Studies) Emily B. Landau - To achieve nuclear rollback via negotiations, the international community will have to be armed with a considerable degree of leverage. The North Korean model demonstrates clearly what happens when a determined proliferator faces international negotiators that are devoid of any leverage for compelling it to reverse course in the nuclear realm. The experience of dealing with North Korea underscores the importance of the economic leverage that the P5+1 finally gained over Iran in 2012, following the set of strong and effective economic and financial sanctions that the U.S. and EU put in place. If this leverage is squandered in return for anything less than very significant nuclear concessions by Iran, the Iranian case will very likely begin looking more and more like North Korea, with the international community increasingly powerless to stop it. The lesson of Libya (2003) and Syria (2013) is that when pressure succeeds in forcing a state to actually make the decision to reverse course, it does not take years to finalize a deal. Indeed, the details can be worked out very quickly, and the process can begin almost immediately. Until Iran makes the strategic decision to reverse course in the nuclear realm, there is little chance that a true and lasting deal will be achieved. Keeping an eye firmly on the leverage is the only hope the P5+1 have to compel Iran to finally make that choice. The writer, a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, is also director of its Arms Control and Regional Security Project. 2013-12-03 00:00:00Full Article
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