Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Christian Science Monitor) Mark Clayton - It's been fairly well documented that the U.S. and Israel created the Stuxnet worm, which ultimately infected and destroyed about 1,000 fuel-refining centrifuges at Iran's secret Natanz nuclear fuel-enrichment facility. But how did Stuxnet infiltrate Natanz? Critical Intelligence, a cyber security firm, outlined a new thesis Tuesday at a security conference in San Francisco. As early as 2004, U.S. intelligence agencies identified an Iranian company, NEDA Industrial Group, that had oversight of the Natanz facility's computerized industrial control systems. Documents suggest that the U.S. was monitoring NEDA's efforts to procure components that may be needed for a nuclear weapons program, says Sean McBride, director of analysis for Critical Intelligence. In 2008, the U.S. targeted the Siemens industrial control systems equipment that NEDA had ordered from overseas. Equipment bound for Iran was intercepted, and Stuxnet was installed on it, before it was sent on its way, McBride posits. 2014-02-28 00:00:00Full Article
New Thesis on How Stuxnet Infiltrated Iran Nuclear Facility
(Christian Science Monitor) Mark Clayton - It's been fairly well documented that the U.S. and Israel created the Stuxnet worm, which ultimately infected and destroyed about 1,000 fuel-refining centrifuges at Iran's secret Natanz nuclear fuel-enrichment facility. But how did Stuxnet infiltrate Natanz? Critical Intelligence, a cyber security firm, outlined a new thesis Tuesday at a security conference in San Francisco. As early as 2004, U.S. intelligence agencies identified an Iranian company, NEDA Industrial Group, that had oversight of the Natanz facility's computerized industrial control systems. Documents suggest that the U.S. was monitoring NEDA's efforts to procure components that may be needed for a nuclear weapons program, says Sean McBride, director of analysis for Critical Intelligence. In 2008, the U.S. targeted the Siemens industrial control systems equipment that NEDA had ordered from overseas. Equipment bound for Iran was intercepted, and Stuxnet was installed on it, before it was sent on its way, McBride posits. 2014-02-28 00:00:00Full Article
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