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Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) James F. Jeffrey and David Pollock - Assuming a final Iranian nuclear agreement is achieved, the task of the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1 to manage the threat of an Iranian nuclear program will not slacken. Thus, the arrangements to encourage Iran to stick with an agreement will be every bit as important as the specifics of an agreement itself. Furthermore, even with an agreement, the U.S. and its partners will face a long-term Iranian push for hegemony in the Middle East. In any likely final agreement with Iran, a residual nuclear enrichment program, however undesirable, will likely be permitted. This will necessitate a regime to prevent Iran from breaking out of that agreement to develop nuclear weapons, or exploiting the threat of a breakout for regional intimidation. Such a regime would require three interlocking components: specific limitations on Iran's program, in order to maximize Iran's prospective breakout time; extensive verification, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities to spot any breakout as soon as possible; and credible response scenarios should a breakout occur. Thus, credibility must urgently be restored to the much-doubted U.S. threat of military force against Iran. 2014-03-13 00:00:00Full Article
Preventing an Iranian Breakout after a Nuclear Deal
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) James F. Jeffrey and David Pollock - Assuming a final Iranian nuclear agreement is achieved, the task of the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1 to manage the threat of an Iranian nuclear program will not slacken. Thus, the arrangements to encourage Iran to stick with an agreement will be every bit as important as the specifics of an agreement itself. Furthermore, even with an agreement, the U.S. and its partners will face a long-term Iranian push for hegemony in the Middle East. In any likely final agreement with Iran, a residual nuclear enrichment program, however undesirable, will likely be permitted. This will necessitate a regime to prevent Iran from breaking out of that agreement to develop nuclear weapons, or exploiting the threat of a breakout for regional intimidation. Such a regime would require three interlocking components: specific limitations on Iran's program, in order to maximize Iran's prospective breakout time; extensive verification, monitoring, and intelligence capabilities to spot any breakout as soon as possible; and credible response scenarios should a breakout occur. Thus, credibility must urgently be restored to the much-doubted U.S. threat of military force against Iran. 2014-03-13 00:00:00Full Article
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