Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai - Besides giving in to Iran by avoiding all major points that were imperative in the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iran, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed upon in November studiously avoided adding any demands that would clarify the outstanding issues and bring about a halt, albeit temporarily, to Iran's unrelenting progress toward the reduction of the potential timetable of producing a first nuclear explosive device. How much time is needed, in a realistic situation, before a breach of Iran's obligations is discovered, reported and responded to? This period should be as long as possible so as not to enable Iran to "break out" and produce a first nuclear device and test it without being found out beforehand. Assigning a year to this period is probably much too low. Two years is a much more rational and acceptable time. The issues are too serious for vagueness. Every case of non-compliance has to be dealt with promptly. The Iranians have the experience and the temerity to exploit each and every weakness and use it to deceive, distort and circumvent in order to arrive at the desired result. Any agreement that does not take these possibilities into account, and ignores the fact that Iran has been (and probably still is) seeking a military nuclear capability, will be a bad one, and should be avoided at all costs. The writer is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. 2014-04-11 00:00:00Full Article
Defining a Bad Agreement with Iran
(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai - Besides giving in to Iran by avoiding all major points that were imperative in the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iran, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed upon in November studiously avoided adding any demands that would clarify the outstanding issues and bring about a halt, albeit temporarily, to Iran's unrelenting progress toward the reduction of the potential timetable of producing a first nuclear explosive device. How much time is needed, in a realistic situation, before a breach of Iran's obligations is discovered, reported and responded to? This period should be as long as possible so as not to enable Iran to "break out" and produce a first nuclear device and test it without being found out beforehand. Assigning a year to this period is probably much too low. Two years is a much more rational and acceptable time. The issues are too serious for vagueness. Every case of non-compliance has to be dealt with promptly. The Iranians have the experience and the temerity to exploit each and every weakness and use it to deceive, distort and circumvent in order to arrive at the desired result. Any agreement that does not take these possibilities into account, and ignores the fact that Iran has been (and probably still is) seeking a military nuclear capability, will be a bad one, and should be avoided at all costs. The writer is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. 2014-04-11 00:00:00Full Article
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