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Formulating an Outline for a Final Agreement with Iran

(Institute for National Security Studies-Tel Aviv University) Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov - Iran's strategy in the negotiations is to maximize its nuclear program's achievements and minimize concessions. While attempting to portray itself as prepared to make significant compromises, Tehran is preserving its core capabilities in two areas related to the development of nuclear weapons: uranium enrichment and plutonium production. Iran agreed to reduce its stockpiles of uranium enriched to 20%, which are not sufficient for even one bomb, in order to keep the inventories of material enriched to a low level (3.5%) which are sufficient for at least six bombs if enriched to a military level. Instead of agreeing to convert the reactor in Arak so that it cannot produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, Iran is proposing technical changes that would be reversible if it decided to violate the agreement. Despite six UN Security Council resolutions calling for the immediate suspension of Iran's enrichment process, it appears that the U.S. has already reached a decision to allow Iran to have a nuclear program within certain limitations. The key parameter is the time it will take Iran to develop nuclear weapons. This time must be measured in a number of years and not, as Secretary Kerry suggests, a number of months. Only a long period of time will allow the international community to discover a breakout to nuclear weapons, decide on action, and implement a decision before Iran possesses nuclear weapons. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin, who served as the IDF's chief of Defense Intelligence, is director of INSS, where Avner Golov is his research assistant.
2014-05-02 00:00:00
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