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Preventing Iranian Nuclear Weapons

(Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) Gregory S. Jones - Negotiations on Iran's nuclear program are continuing in an effort to prevent Iran from being able to produce nuclear weapons. However, this objective will not be attainable unless the agreement addresses key aspects of Iran's nuclear program, fixes the flaws in the interim agreement which seriously constrain any agreement, and recognizes fundamental problems with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as currently implemented. Iran's ability to quickly produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) means that Iran is already a de facto nuclear weapon state. Any successful nuclear agreement with Iran would need to deny it easy access to HEU, not only in the short-term but in the long-term as well. Similarly, any fix for Iran's Arak plutonium production reactor would need to address the possibility that the reactor could be reconverted to produce significant amounts of plutonium. The terms of the final agreement have already been enunciated in the November 2013 "Joint Plan of Action" (JPA), namely that Iran will have an unrestricted centrifuge enrichment program. This will only enhance Iran's nuclear weapon capability in the long term. Iran should have no centrifuge enrichment capability and it should not be possible to reconvert the Arak reactor to natural uranium fuel for large-scale plutonium production.
2014-06-06 00:00:00
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