Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Belfer Center-Harvard University) Olli Heinonen - The P5+1 negotiations with Iran should include talks on Iran's ballistic missile capability. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 requested, inter alia, that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The IAEA report from November 2011 describes Iranian work - known as Project 111 - on engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber, which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab-3 missile. The IAEA has assessed that the payload in question is likely a nuclear device. In light of these findings, addressing verifiable limits to Iran's ballistic missile capabilities should form part of a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The agreement should seek to suspend Iran's ballistic missile-related work and/or impose a moratorium on the testing of all ballistic missiles, with verifiable ends. Ignoring the strategic linkage between Iran's nuclear program and its missile program weakens any monitoring and verification system, undermines regional stability and security, and disregards both UN Security Council Resolution 1929 and the sanctions termination criteria as stipulated in U.S. law. The writer was Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.2014-09-24 00:00:00Full Article
Why Iran's Ballistic Missiles Matter
(Belfer Center-Harvard University) Olli Heinonen - The P5+1 negotiations with Iran should include talks on Iran's ballistic missile capability. UN Security Council Resolution 1929 requested, inter alia, that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The IAEA report from November 2011 describes Iranian work - known as Project 111 - on engineering studies to examine how to integrate a new spherical payload into the existing payload chamber, which would be mounted in the re-entry vehicle of the Shahab-3 missile. The IAEA has assessed that the payload in question is likely a nuclear device. In light of these findings, addressing verifiable limits to Iran's ballistic missile capabilities should form part of a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The agreement should seek to suspend Iran's ballistic missile-related work and/or impose a moratorium on the testing of all ballistic missiles, with verifiable ends. Ignoring the strategic linkage between Iran's nuclear program and its missile program weakens any monitoring and verification system, undermines regional stability and security, and disregards both UN Security Council Resolution 1929 and the sanctions termination criteria as stipulated in U.S. law. The writer was Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.2014-09-24 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
Search:
|