Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Israel Defense) David Ivry - Limited-scale, asymmetrical conflicts have become the norm. After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the deterrence of the last eight years was not achieved because of the accomplishments of the Israeli military. It was the result of other interests that had evolved and over which we had no control or influence. Achieving deterrence is not the most important objective. The national defense interest transcends deterrence. For example, during the First Gulf War, the State of Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, avoided responding to the missiles launched into Israel from Iraq, thereby leading many people to claim that we lost our deterrence. However, the other national strategic interests we upheld were more important, which means that deterrence is not the dominant strategic goal. Additionally, it is important to understand that deterrence is not always achieved through a decisive military blow, but rather by creating interests that both parties would like to maintain or would be afraid of losing. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) David Ivry was Commander of the Israel Air Force, Chairman of the National Security Council, and Israel's Ambassador to the U.S. 2014-10-03 00:00:00Full Article
Achieving Deterrence Is Not the Most Important Objective
(Israel Defense) David Ivry - Limited-scale, asymmetrical conflicts have become the norm. After the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the deterrence of the last eight years was not achieved because of the accomplishments of the Israeli military. It was the result of other interests that had evolved and over which we had no control or influence. Achieving deterrence is not the most important objective. The national defense interest transcends deterrence. For example, during the First Gulf War, the State of Israel, under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, avoided responding to the missiles launched into Israel from Iraq, thereby leading many people to claim that we lost our deterrence. However, the other national strategic interests we upheld were more important, which means that deterrence is not the dominant strategic goal. Additionally, it is important to understand that deterrence is not always achieved through a decisive military blow, but rather by creating interests that both parties would like to maintain or would be afraid of losing. Maj.-Gen. (ret.) David Ivry was Commander of the Israel Air Force, Chairman of the National Security Council, and Israel's Ambassador to the U.S. 2014-10-03 00:00:00Full Article
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