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Why Iraqi Army Can't Fight, Despite $25 Billion in U.S. Aid, Training

(Los Angeles Times) David Zucchino - On June 9 in Mosul in northern Iraq, a federal paramilitary police division and two army divisions disintegrated as thousands of soldiers and police officers shed their uniforms, dropped their weapons and ran for their lives before attacking Islamic State fighters. "Our commanders were afraid of Daesh [IS]. They were too afraid to lead us," said police officer Hussein Shehab, 43. The military collapsed in Mosul even though Washington spent eight years and $25 billion to train, arm and equip Iraq's security forces. Iraqi security force members acknowledge that many Sunnis and other minorities see the Shiite-led army as a brutal occupying force. Under former Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, a Shiite, Sunnis were driven out of the security forces and replaced by Shiites. Worse, Maliki integrated Shiite militias, accused of torturing and killing Sunnis, into the army and police. "The army became Maliki's private militia," said retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen. Paul D. Eaton, who was in charge of military training in Iraq in 2003 and 2004. Shehab said U.S. training was useful. But as soon as the American advisors left, "our commanders told us to ignore what the Americans taught us." Shehab and others said their ranks in Mosul were infiltrated by Islamic State agents posing as police or soldiers. The militants knew their plans and operations, they said, and some commanders were sympathetic to Islamic State. Eaton said without competent ground forces, U.S. and coalition airstrikes will have minimal effect because they cannot teach the "moral component" to fight and die for a common cause. "Until the Iraqi soldier in his eyes is a legitimate actor for a legitimate government, we are not going to have any hope of success."
2014-11-07 00:00:00
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