Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(New York Times) David E. Sanger and William J. Broad - Behind the efforts to close a nuclear deal with Iran lies a delicate question: how to design an agreement to maximize the chances that Western intelligence agencies would catch any effort to develop an atomic bomb at a covert site. Concern over the possibility of a future Iranian covert program - and the difficulty of writing a document that deals with the unknown - is rooted in a long history of distrust. Negotiators are focusing on the fate of Iran's three major "declared" nuclear facilities, which are crawling with inspectors and cameras. Unstated is the risk of a bomb being produced at an undetected facility, or built from fuel and components obtained from North Korea. The goal is to allow highly intrusive inspections to track the precursors and parts that feed Iran's uranium complex, according to one participant in the negotiations. 2014-11-24 00:00:00Full Article
In Iran Talks, U.S. Seeks to Prevent a Covert Weapon
(New York Times) David E. Sanger and William J. Broad - Behind the efforts to close a nuclear deal with Iran lies a delicate question: how to design an agreement to maximize the chances that Western intelligence agencies would catch any effort to develop an atomic bomb at a covert site. Concern over the possibility of a future Iranian covert program - and the difficulty of writing a document that deals with the unknown - is rooted in a long history of distrust. Negotiators are focusing on the fate of Iran's three major "declared" nuclear facilities, which are crawling with inspectors and cameras. Unstated is the risk of a bomb being produced at an undetected facility, or built from fuel and components obtained from North Korea. The goal is to allow highly intrusive inspections to track the precursors and parts that feed Iran's uranium complex, according to one participant in the negotiations. 2014-11-24 00:00:00Full Article
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