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12 Months Is Not Enough Time to Stop an Iranian Nuclear Breakout

(National Interest) Emily B. Landau - The objective of the P5+1 is to keep Iran a year from "breakout" - the ability to quickly assemble one nuclear device. The logic is that with some modifications to Iran's nuclear infrastructure and an "ironclad" verification regime, 12 months will be enough time for an Iranian violation to be detected and for the international community to respond before Iran is able to move to a weapons capability. In a perfect world, they might be right. But in the real world, and based on the experience of the past 11 years, this best-case scenario assumption is unwarranted. It is much more likely that 12 months will be insufficient time for detection and response. Once an agreement with Iran is achieved, the negotiators will be ecstatic with their success, and eager to proceed with economic and political cooperation and new ties. The last thing they will want is to find evidence that the agreement is not being adhered to. In fact, the instinct of the P5+1 will be to look the other way if faced with evidence, and they will certainly have no incentive to actively seek it out. People will challenge the veracity and significance of any evidence. This will be time-consuming, and will come at the expense of the ability to make a quick call that there is clear evidence of a violation. The Iranian regime consciously avoids blatant violations that may elicit a harsh international response, preferring to move slowly, bit by bit. That's how Iran got from several hundred centrifuges to 19,000, including advanced models, and from the first kilograms of low-enriched uranium to an amount today, which if enriched to weapons-grade level, would be enough for six to seven nuclear devices. The writer is head of the Arms Control Program at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.
2014-12-19 00:00:00
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