Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Jerusalem Report) Emily B. Landau - Nothing has changed with regard to Iran's basic desire to retain and advance its nuclear breakout option - namely, the ability to move quickly to a military nuclear capability before the international community can stop it. Negotiations so far show that Iran's steadfast defiance in resisting any significant concessions with regard to its nuclear program has been met time and again with concessions by the P5+1. The "creative solutions" that the P5+1 have put on the table with regard to the future of the nuclear facilities at Arak and Fordow and the configuration of centrifuges, as well as their demonstrated unwillingness to press Iran on the weaponization aspects of its program, are all symptomatic of the P5+1's negotiating weakness. In terms of the negotiations dynamic, the decision in November to extend the talks for seven months has implicitly strengthened Iran's hand, in that it has further entrenched the perception that the P5+1 are committed to diplomacy, no matter what. When it is understood by Iran that other strategies will not be embraced or even considered, this becomes a liability, weakening international leverage. Even the best-case scenario from a P5+1 perspective can no longer be regarded as a good deal. Even if an agreement is secured, the provisions are unlikely to afford the international community sufficient time to stop Iran from achieving breakout. The writer heads the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. 2015-01-09 00:00:00Full Article
Tehran Keeps the Upper Hand in Nuclear Talks
(Jerusalem Report) Emily B. Landau - Nothing has changed with regard to Iran's basic desire to retain and advance its nuclear breakout option - namely, the ability to move quickly to a military nuclear capability before the international community can stop it. Negotiations so far show that Iran's steadfast defiance in resisting any significant concessions with regard to its nuclear program has been met time and again with concessions by the P5+1. The "creative solutions" that the P5+1 have put on the table with regard to the future of the nuclear facilities at Arak and Fordow and the configuration of centrifuges, as well as their demonstrated unwillingness to press Iran on the weaponization aspects of its program, are all symptomatic of the P5+1's negotiating weakness. In terms of the negotiations dynamic, the decision in November to extend the talks for seven months has implicitly strengthened Iran's hand, in that it has further entrenched the perception that the P5+1 are committed to diplomacy, no matter what. When it is understood by Iran that other strategies will not be embraced or even considered, this becomes a liability, weakening international leverage. Even the best-case scenario from a P5+1 perspective can no longer be regarded as a good deal. Even if an agreement is secured, the provisions are unlikely to afford the international community sufficient time to stop Iran from achieving breakout. The writer heads the Arms Control and Regional Security Program at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. 2015-01-09 00:00:00Full Article
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