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The Required Professional Negotiation with Iran

Ariel (Eli) Levite (Ha'aretz-Hebrew-9March2015) - Iran aims at reaching an accord that would be in effect for a minimal amount of time, after which Iran would regain its status as a regular player in the international community. Once the basis for special demands on the country has expired, Iran will have the right to develop its nuclear capabilities nearly undisturbed, with only modest oversight arrangements. Considering that there already is an agreement between the two sides that during the period of the accord Iran keeps and operates thousands of first-generation centrifuges alongside research and development of more advanced centrifuges, the exact number to be agreed on and the accompanying arrangements for stockpiling enriched uranium are of secondary importance. The effect this number would have on the time period required for producing enough material for a weaponized nuclear device would be no more than several months. Therefore, the importance of supervision and transparency arrangements required from Iran is greater than the actual number of centrifuges. Only strict supervision arrangements have the power of deterring Iran from violating the accord, or at the very least exposing such violations should they occur. For the accord to be trustworthy, the American administration, Congress, the UN Security Council, and the IAEA Board of Governors will have to act decisively to anchor the accord with a strict supervision mechanism that has the ability to locate and warn against violations of the accord. There is also a need to construct a formal and practical structure for swift and efficient action in the case that violations are detected - public or secret diplomatic moves, sanctions, and even military action if necessary. Only serious action in all these venues has the ability to turn a problematic nuclear accord with Iran into one that provides a higher chance of success. The writer, a nonresident senior associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment, was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007. He also served as deputy national security adviser for defense policy and was head of the Bureau of International Security and Arms Control in the Israel Ministry of Defense.
2015-03-16 00:00:00
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