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- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
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(Politico) Dennis Ross - The tentative framework understanding that the P5+1 is now finalizing with Iran represents progress toward constraining the Iranian nuclear program. However, the claim of the Obama administration that any eventual agreement will block all pathways toward an Iranian nuclear weapon is surely an overstatement. At best, a deal will create impediments for the life of the agreement but offer little afterward. The agreement does not reflect the objective we had hoped to achieve for much of President Obama's first term. At that point, when I was in the administration, our aim was to transform the character of the Iranian nuclear program so that the peaceful intent of its capabilities would be demonstrated unmistakably to the international community. That meant that Iran could not have a large nuclear infrastructure. At some point, the Obama administration changed its objective, reflecting a judgment that we were not able to alter Iranian intentions, so instead we needed to focus on constraining their capabilities. But by definition, when we speak about a one-year breakout time, we are accepting that Iran will have the means and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. If the measure of the negotiations is now about breakout time, then the administration needs to show convincingly that the verification regime will be far-reaching and capable of detecting whatever the Iranians are doing and whenever they do it. Moreover, for those who say that one year is not enough time because even discovery of a violation does not ensure a response, the administration will need to explain why this agreement will not function like other arms control agreements, where questions related to noncompliance have historically bogged down in endless discussions. Amb. Dennis Ross is a long-time U.S. Mideast negotiator. 2015-04-01 00:00:00Full Article
Deal or No, Iran Will Remain a Nuclear Threat
(Politico) Dennis Ross - The tentative framework understanding that the P5+1 is now finalizing with Iran represents progress toward constraining the Iranian nuclear program. However, the claim of the Obama administration that any eventual agreement will block all pathways toward an Iranian nuclear weapon is surely an overstatement. At best, a deal will create impediments for the life of the agreement but offer little afterward. The agreement does not reflect the objective we had hoped to achieve for much of President Obama's first term. At that point, when I was in the administration, our aim was to transform the character of the Iranian nuclear program so that the peaceful intent of its capabilities would be demonstrated unmistakably to the international community. That meant that Iran could not have a large nuclear infrastructure. At some point, the Obama administration changed its objective, reflecting a judgment that we were not able to alter Iranian intentions, so instead we needed to focus on constraining their capabilities. But by definition, when we speak about a one-year breakout time, we are accepting that Iran will have the means and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. If the measure of the negotiations is now about breakout time, then the administration needs to show convincingly that the verification regime will be far-reaching and capable of detecting whatever the Iranians are doing and whenever they do it. Moreover, for those who say that one year is not enough time because even discovery of a violation does not ensure a response, the administration will need to explain why this agreement will not function like other arms control agreements, where questions related to noncompliance have historically bogged down in endless discussions. Amb. Dennis Ross is a long-time U.S. Mideast negotiator. 2015-04-01 00:00:00Full Article
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