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(Washington Free Beacon) Bill Gertz - Despite promises by President Obama that Iranian cheating on a new treaty will be detected, "the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will not be effectively verifiable," said Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation from 2002 to 2009. Arms control experts challenged the administration's assertions that a final deal can be verified, based on Iran's past cheating and the failure of similar arms verification procedures. U.S. intelligence agencies, which will be called on to verify the agreement, have a spotty record for estimating foreign arms programs. A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate falsely concluded that Iran halted work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The IAEA, in a 2011 report, contradicted the estimate by stating that Iran continued nuclear arms work past 2003, including work on computer modeling used in building nuclear warheads. DeSutter said the transparency measures announced at best could detect quantitative excesses at known locations, but not secret illegal activities, like those that Iran carried out on a large scale in violation of its obligations under the NPT. David S. Sullivan, a former CIA arms verification specialist, said past cheating by Iran was confirmed as recently as July 2014. "Why are we negotiating for a new agreement, when existing Iranian NPT violations remain in effect, ongoing, and unresolved, suggesting that Iran is unlikely to comply with any new agreement?" Sullivan said. "The negotiations started as an attempt to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, but now they have legitimized it." 2015-04-07 00:00:00Full Article
Verifying Iran Nuclear Deal Not Possible, Experts Say
(Washington Free Beacon) Bill Gertz - Despite promises by President Obama that Iranian cheating on a new treaty will be detected, "the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will not be effectively verifiable," said Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance, and implementation from 2002 to 2009. Arms control experts challenged the administration's assertions that a final deal can be verified, based on Iran's past cheating and the failure of similar arms verification procedures. U.S. intelligence agencies, which will be called on to verify the agreement, have a spotty record for estimating foreign arms programs. A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate falsely concluded that Iran halted work on nuclear weapons in 2003. The IAEA, in a 2011 report, contradicted the estimate by stating that Iran continued nuclear arms work past 2003, including work on computer modeling used in building nuclear warheads. DeSutter said the transparency measures announced at best could detect quantitative excesses at known locations, but not secret illegal activities, like those that Iran carried out on a large scale in violation of its obligations under the NPT. David S. Sullivan, a former CIA arms verification specialist, said past cheating by Iran was confirmed as recently as July 2014. "Why are we negotiating for a new agreement, when existing Iranian NPT violations remain in effect, ongoing, and unresolved, suggesting that Iran is unlikely to comply with any new agreement?" Sullivan said. "The negotiations started as an attempt to stop Iran's nuclear weapons program, but now they have legitimized it." 2015-04-07 00:00:00Full Article
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