Home
Archives
Jerusalem Center Homepage
View the current issue
Jerusalem Center Videos
Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
Back
(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau - Knowledge of the military aspects of Iran's nuclear program is essential for assessing Iran's potential to produce nuclear explosive devices, and is therefore crucial for good and effective verification. The Iranian leadership - which continues to harbor military nuclear ambitions - is well aware of the importance of this issue, and has therefore been emphatic in its rejection of inspections of secret military facilities. Unfortunately, the P5+1 gave up the option of including ballistic missiles in the final deal, seemingly acquiescing to Iran's claim that these delivery systems are "non-nuclear." In the current dynamic, the pressure of sanctions began to be eased before the final agreement was reached, which has only weakened the hand of the P5+1. Rather than calling Iran's bluff at the table, secure in the knowledge that Iran would not leave because it seeks sanctions relief, the powers began offering concessions. For Iran this attempt at "fair play" by the U.S. only spelled weakness, and this was Iran's cue to harden its red lines and demands. As we move into the final stretch, there are two choices: either giving in further to Iran's demands, or not reaching a deal. But no matter what the nature of the remaining sticking points, the closer the P5+1 feels they are to a deal, the more committed they are to not pronouncing whatever they achieve to be a bad deal. Unfortunately, this will amount to a well-orchestrated face-saving farce. Iran will practically retain the option to invest in a clandestine operation to produce the necessary fissile material for the core of a nuclear explosive device, with the explosive part of this device already achieved in military facilities that will not be prone to inspection. Dr. Ephraim Asculai is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Dr. Emily B. Landau is director of the Arms Control and Regional Security program at INSS. 2015-05-28 00:00:00Full Article
As Showdown Time with Iran Draws Near, What Are the Real Choices?
(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai and Emily B. Landau - Knowledge of the military aspects of Iran's nuclear program is essential for assessing Iran's potential to produce nuclear explosive devices, and is therefore crucial for good and effective verification. The Iranian leadership - which continues to harbor military nuclear ambitions - is well aware of the importance of this issue, and has therefore been emphatic in its rejection of inspections of secret military facilities. Unfortunately, the P5+1 gave up the option of including ballistic missiles in the final deal, seemingly acquiescing to Iran's claim that these delivery systems are "non-nuclear." In the current dynamic, the pressure of sanctions began to be eased before the final agreement was reached, which has only weakened the hand of the P5+1. Rather than calling Iran's bluff at the table, secure in the knowledge that Iran would not leave because it seeks sanctions relief, the powers began offering concessions. For Iran this attempt at "fair play" by the U.S. only spelled weakness, and this was Iran's cue to harden its red lines and demands. As we move into the final stretch, there are two choices: either giving in further to Iran's demands, or not reaching a deal. But no matter what the nature of the remaining sticking points, the closer the P5+1 feels they are to a deal, the more committed they are to not pronouncing whatever they achieve to be a bad deal. Unfortunately, this will amount to a well-orchestrated face-saving farce. Iran will practically retain the option to invest in a clandestine operation to produce the necessary fissile material for the core of a nuclear explosive device, with the explosive part of this device already achieved in military facilities that will not be prone to inspection. Dr. Ephraim Asculai is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Dr. Emily B. Landau is director of the Arms Control and Regional Security program at INSS. 2015-05-28 00:00:00Full Article
Search Daily Alert
|
Search:
|