Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson - Iran's current timeframe for acquiring enough high-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb - known as breakout time - is around two or three months, and the U.S. wants a deal that extends that period to at least one year. In Washington's view, a full year would provide enough time to detect noncompliance and take diplomatic or military action if Tehran seems poised to make an illegal dash for a nuclear weapon. Yet the use of more efficient centrifuges would shorten that time, so Iran's determination to develop more advanced machines is as much a concern as, for example, its continuing retention of large low-enriched uranium stockpiles despite a commitment in the parameters that they be converted into less contentious forms. Close attention to several technical factors is essential to the success of a nuclear deal, including the number and type of installed, operable centrifuges; Iran's inventories of enriched uranium; the dismantling of excess centrifuges; unfettered inspection access; and enhanced intelligence on and enforcement of compliance. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Simon Henderson is director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. 2015-06-18 00:00:00Full Article
How to Make Sure Iran's One-Year Nuclear Breakout Time Does Not Shrink
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Olli Heinonen and Simon Henderson - Iran's current timeframe for acquiring enough high-enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb - known as breakout time - is around two or three months, and the U.S. wants a deal that extends that period to at least one year. In Washington's view, a full year would provide enough time to detect noncompliance and take diplomatic or military action if Tehran seems poised to make an illegal dash for a nuclear weapon. Yet the use of more efficient centrifuges would shorten that time, so Iran's determination to develop more advanced machines is as much a concern as, for example, its continuing retention of large low-enriched uranium stockpiles despite a commitment in the parameters that they be converted into less contentious forms. Close attention to several technical factors is essential to the success of a nuclear deal, including the number and type of installed, operable centrifuges; Iran's inventories of enriched uranium; the dismantling of excess centrifuges; unfettered inspection access; and enhanced intelligence on and enforcement of compliance. Olli Heinonen is a senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center and a former deputy director-general for safeguards at the IAEA. Simon Henderson is director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at The Washington Institute. 2015-06-18 00:00:00Full Article
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