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(Tablet) Ronen Bergman - On Nov. 26, 2013, three days after the signing of the interim agreement between the powers and Iran, the Iranian delegation returned home to report to their government. According to information obtained by Israeli intelligence, there was a sense of great satisfaction in Tehran then over the agreement and confidence that ultimately Iran would be able to persuade the West to accede to a final deal favorable to Iran. The Iranian delegates told their superiors that "our most significant achievement" was America's consent to the continued enrichment of uranium on Iranian territory - a complete about-face from America's declared position prior to and during the talks. In early 2013, Israel learned from intelligence sources in Iran that the U.S. held a secret dialogue with senior Iranian representatives in Muscat, Oman. Only toward the end of these talks did Israel receive an official report about them from the U.S. government. Shortly afterward, the CIA and NSA drastically curtailed cooperation with Israel on operations aimed at disrupting the Iranian nuclear project, operations that had racked up significant successes over the past decade. Perusal of the intelligence material makes two conclusions fairly clear: The Western delegates gave up on almost every one of the critical issues they had themselves resolved not to give in on, and also that they had distinctly promised Israel they would not do so. Israeli intelligence points to the Teba and Tesa plants in Iran's military industry that are currently engaged in the development of new centrifuges: the IR6 and IR8. The new centrifuges will allow the Iranians to set up smaller enrichment facilities that are much more difficult to detect and that shorten the break-out time to a bomb. President Obama said at the Saban Forum that Iran has no need for advanced centrifuges and his representatives promised Israel several times that further R&D on them would not be permitted. In the final agreement Iran is permitted to continue developing the advanced centrifuges. The writer is a senior political and military analyst for Yediot Ahronot. 2015-07-29 00:00:00Full Article
What Israeli Intelligence Learned about the Iran Talks
(Tablet) Ronen Bergman - On Nov. 26, 2013, three days after the signing of the interim agreement between the powers and Iran, the Iranian delegation returned home to report to their government. According to information obtained by Israeli intelligence, there was a sense of great satisfaction in Tehran then over the agreement and confidence that ultimately Iran would be able to persuade the West to accede to a final deal favorable to Iran. The Iranian delegates told their superiors that "our most significant achievement" was America's consent to the continued enrichment of uranium on Iranian territory - a complete about-face from America's declared position prior to and during the talks. In early 2013, Israel learned from intelligence sources in Iran that the U.S. held a secret dialogue with senior Iranian representatives in Muscat, Oman. Only toward the end of these talks did Israel receive an official report about them from the U.S. government. Shortly afterward, the CIA and NSA drastically curtailed cooperation with Israel on operations aimed at disrupting the Iranian nuclear project, operations that had racked up significant successes over the past decade. Perusal of the intelligence material makes two conclusions fairly clear: The Western delegates gave up on almost every one of the critical issues they had themselves resolved not to give in on, and also that they had distinctly promised Israel they would not do so. Israeli intelligence points to the Teba and Tesa plants in Iran's military industry that are currently engaged in the development of new centrifuges: the IR6 and IR8. The new centrifuges will allow the Iranians to set up smaller enrichment facilities that are much more difficult to detect and that shorten the break-out time to a bomb. President Obama said at the Saban Forum that Iran has no need for advanced centrifuges and his representatives promised Israel several times that further R&D on them would not be permitted. In the final agreement Iran is permitted to continue developing the advanced centrifuges. The writer is a senior political and military analyst for Yediot Ahronot. 2015-07-29 00:00:00Full Article
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