Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(National Interest) Emily B. Landau - The narrative of "no alternative" to the Iran deal never was an accurate description of reality. It was always a political tactic that worked especially well with populations that are so frightened of the short-term implications of any military threat that they are willing to close their eyes not only to the problems with this deal, but to the vastly more dangerous longer-term implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran was successful in achieving its goals in the negotiation - namely, to lift all sanctions, retain its breakout capability and gain international recognition and legitimacy for its vast nuclear program - in large part because it stuck to its narrative and its red lines. Iran simply refused to budge on anything of true significance. The U.S. feared that if the P5+1 were tougher with Iran, the talks would have collapsed. But Iran was at the table because it desperately needed sanctions relief; therefore, it would not really have let the talks collapse. Now U.S. officials are again twisting the facts and the alternatives, presenting its concessions as nonconcessions. If Congress does voice its opposition, it would be a strong message that this is indeed a bad deal, and that in turn could perhaps garner support for efforts to at least improve mechanisms of dealing with Iranian violations. The writer is head of the Arms Control Program at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. 2015-08-03 00:00:00Full Article
A Deeply Flawed Deal
(National Interest) Emily B. Landau - The narrative of "no alternative" to the Iran deal never was an accurate description of reality. It was always a political tactic that worked especially well with populations that are so frightened of the short-term implications of any military threat that they are willing to close their eyes not only to the problems with this deal, but to the vastly more dangerous longer-term implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran was successful in achieving its goals in the negotiation - namely, to lift all sanctions, retain its breakout capability and gain international recognition and legitimacy for its vast nuclear program - in large part because it stuck to its narrative and its red lines. Iran simply refused to budge on anything of true significance. The U.S. feared that if the P5+1 were tougher with Iran, the talks would have collapsed. But Iran was at the table because it desperately needed sanctions relief; therefore, it would not really have let the talks collapse. Now U.S. officials are again twisting the facts and the alternatives, presenting its concessions as nonconcessions. If Congress does voice its opposition, it would be a strong message that this is indeed a bad deal, and that in turn could perhaps garner support for efforts to at least improve mechanisms of dealing with Iranian violations. The writer is head of the Arms Control Program at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. 2015-08-03 00:00:00Full Article
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