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(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Robert Satloff - The Iran nuclear accord is not a treaty or even an "executive agreement." It is a voluntary set of understandings that has no status in law. Thus, a resolution to disapprove the Iran agreement may have limited practical impact. It would not override President Obama's authority to enter into the agreement. Nor would it restrict his authority to participate in most aspects of enforcing the agreement. Indeed, the sole practical implication would be to restrict his authority under law to waive nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. And a resolution of disapproval would have no authority to force him to vigorously enforce such sanctions. The first responsibilities under the deal are Iran's. These include satisfying the IAEA on the question of "possible military dimensions," mothballing thousands of centrifuges, shrinking its massive stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg., and gutting the core of its Arak plutonium reactor. Most experts believe this process will take between six to nine months. Only once the IAEA certifies that Iran has fulfilled those requirements does U.S. and international sanctions relief become an operative issue. Iran is unlikely to respond to congressional disapproval by enriching uranium with reckless abandon and thereby validating the skeptics who never trusted its commitment to a solely peaceful nuclear program. After Tehran has worked for two decades to advance a program that is on the verge of international legitimacy and ending nuclear-related sanctions, it would make little sense to chuck those achievements in a state of pique. To the contrary, Iran is far more likely to fulfill its core requirements so as to earn the termination of UN and EU sanctions that would come with IAEA certification. The writer is executive director of The Washington Institute. 2015-08-11 00:00:00Full Article
A "No" Vote on the Iran Nuclear Agreement May Have Limited Practical Impact
(Washington Institute for Near East Policy) Robert Satloff - The Iran nuclear accord is not a treaty or even an "executive agreement." It is a voluntary set of understandings that has no status in law. Thus, a resolution to disapprove the Iran agreement may have limited practical impact. It would not override President Obama's authority to enter into the agreement. Nor would it restrict his authority to participate in most aspects of enforcing the agreement. Indeed, the sole practical implication would be to restrict his authority under law to waive nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. And a resolution of disapproval would have no authority to force him to vigorously enforce such sanctions. The first responsibilities under the deal are Iran's. These include satisfying the IAEA on the question of "possible military dimensions," mothballing thousands of centrifuges, shrinking its massive stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 300 kg., and gutting the core of its Arak plutonium reactor. Most experts believe this process will take between six to nine months. Only once the IAEA certifies that Iran has fulfilled those requirements does U.S. and international sanctions relief become an operative issue. Iran is unlikely to respond to congressional disapproval by enriching uranium with reckless abandon and thereby validating the skeptics who never trusted its commitment to a solely peaceful nuclear program. After Tehran has worked for two decades to advance a program that is on the verge of international legitimacy and ending nuclear-related sanctions, it would make little sense to chuck those achievements in a state of pique. To the contrary, Iran is far more likely to fulfill its core requirements so as to earn the termination of UN and EU sanctions that would come with IAEA certification. The writer is executive director of The Washington Institute. 2015-08-11 00:00:00Full Article
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