Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Institute for National Security Studies) Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein - The problem Israel and many of its neighbors have faced is that the P5+1 have not perceived a permanent halt to Iran's nuclear drive as in their interest to the same degree that Israel does; and yet, it is Israel and these other Middle East states that will be the first to suffer the consequences of the P5+1 failure to produce a good deal. Accordingly, the longer-term security calculations of the strong powers have taken a dangerous backseat to their short-term desire to remove this issue from the agenda. In this frustrating environment for Israel, in which it does not have a formal role, what were its real options? For Netanyahu, it was always about maintaining awareness of the danger in policymaking circles and in terms of wider public perceptions. In this respect, he probably did more than any one leader to put the Iranian nuclear issue on the global agenda in a manner that could not be ignored and keep it there for a long time. Then during the course of 2014-2015, the Obama administration's position on the ultimate goal of the negotiation seems to have shifted, from largely dismantling Iran's nuclear program to trying to manage it. It is when Obama's speech to an AIPAC gathering promising that his policy is one of prevention, not containment, began to ring hollow. Once the objective of the negotiators changed, it was clear that Israel would not endorse the new direction. It also became clear that Israel and the U.S. would be on a collision course, unless Israel agreed to adjust its own objectives and undercut its steadfast position that an Iranian nuclear weapon must be prevented through dismantlement and verification. Emily Landau directs the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at INSS, where former Israeli ambassador Shimon Stein is a senior research fellow. 2015-08-20 00:00:00Full Article
The Iran Nuclear Deal: The U.S. Changed the Objective
(Institute for National Security Studies) Emily B. Landau and Shimon Stein - The problem Israel and many of its neighbors have faced is that the P5+1 have not perceived a permanent halt to Iran's nuclear drive as in their interest to the same degree that Israel does; and yet, it is Israel and these other Middle East states that will be the first to suffer the consequences of the P5+1 failure to produce a good deal. Accordingly, the longer-term security calculations of the strong powers have taken a dangerous backseat to their short-term desire to remove this issue from the agenda. In this frustrating environment for Israel, in which it does not have a formal role, what were its real options? For Netanyahu, it was always about maintaining awareness of the danger in policymaking circles and in terms of wider public perceptions. In this respect, he probably did more than any one leader to put the Iranian nuclear issue on the global agenda in a manner that could not be ignored and keep it there for a long time. Then during the course of 2014-2015, the Obama administration's position on the ultimate goal of the negotiation seems to have shifted, from largely dismantling Iran's nuclear program to trying to manage it. It is when Obama's speech to an AIPAC gathering promising that his policy is one of prevention, not containment, began to ring hollow. Once the objective of the negotiators changed, it was clear that Israel would not endorse the new direction. It also became clear that Israel and the U.S. would be on a collision course, unless Israel agreed to adjust its own objectives and undercut its steadfast position that an Iranian nuclear weapon must be prevented through dismantlement and verification. Emily Landau directs the Arms Control and Regional Security Project at INSS, where former Israeli ambassador Shimon Stein is a senior research fellow. 2015-08-20 00:00:00Full Article
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