Additional Resources
Top Commentators:
- Elliott Abrams
- Fouad Ajami
- Shlomo Avineri
- Benny Avni
- Alan Dershowitz
- Jackson Diehl
- Dore Gold
- Daniel Gordis
- Tom Gross
- Jonathan Halevy
- David Ignatius
- Pinchas Inbari
- Jeff Jacoby
- Efraim Karsh
- Mordechai Kedar
- Charles Krauthammer
- Emily Landau
- David Makovsky
- Aaron David Miller
- Benny Morris
- Jacques Neriah
- Marty Peretz
- Melanie Phillips
- Daniel Pipes
- Harold Rhode
- Gary Rosenblatt
- Jennifer Rubin
- David Schenkar
- Shimon Shapira
- Jonathan Spyer
- Gerald Steinberg
- Bret Stephens
- Amir Taheri
- Josh Teitelbaum
- Khaled Abu Toameh
- Jonathan Tobin
- Michael Totten
- Michael Young
- Mort Zuckerman
Think Tanks:
- American Enterprise Institute
- Brookings Institution
- Center for Security Policy
- Council on Foreign Relations
- Heritage Foundation
- Hudson Institute
- Institute for Contemporary Affairs
- Institute for Counter-Terrorism
- Institute for Global Jewish Affairs
- Institute for National Security Studies
- Institute for Science and Intl. Security
- Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
- Investigative Project
- Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs
- RAND Corporation
- Saban Center for Middle East Policy
- Shalem Center
- Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Media:
- CAMERA
- Daily Alert
- Jewish Political Studies Review
- MEMRI
- NGO Monitor
- Palestinian Media Watch
- The Israel Project
- YouTube
Government:
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(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai - Any self-inspection role for Iran will run counter to the presently accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification methodology. How can one trust information produced, even partially, by the Iranians, who have such a distinguished record of concealment, lying and non-compliance with NPT and safeguards obligations? It can be envisioned that in future cases, if and when Iran is challenged to permit inspections at a named suspect site, it will surely demand the same privileges it has in the present situation. Moreover, other nations under IAEA safeguards could justifiably demand that they be accorded the same privileges as Iran and be permitted to carry out their own inspections. The IAEA should declassify and publish the confidential arrangements and bring them for the approval of its Board of Governors (BOG). The BOG should consider declaring these agreements null and void if they do not conform to IAEA standards and norms. If the situation is allowed to remain unchanged, this will become the symbol of the unwillingness of the world to confront Iran, and prove that the many declarations assuring the delay of Iran's breakout potential are without any basis. Dr. Ephraim Asculai, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years.2015-08-25 00:00:00Full Article
The Unbelievable Side-Agreements with Iran
(Jerusalem Post) Ephraim Asculai - Any self-inspection role for Iran will run counter to the presently accepted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verification methodology. How can one trust information produced, even partially, by the Iranians, who have such a distinguished record of concealment, lying and non-compliance with NPT and safeguards obligations? It can be envisioned that in future cases, if and when Iran is challenged to permit inspections at a named suspect site, it will surely demand the same privileges it has in the present situation. Moreover, other nations under IAEA safeguards could justifiably demand that they be accorded the same privileges as Iran and be permitted to carry out their own inspections. The IAEA should declassify and publish the confidential arrangements and bring them for the approval of its Board of Governors (BOG). The BOG should consider declaring these agreements null and void if they do not conform to IAEA standards and norms. If the situation is allowed to remain unchanged, this will become the symbol of the unwillingness of the world to confront Iran, and prove that the many declarations assuring the delay of Iran's breakout potential are without any basis. Dr. Ephraim Asculai, a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), worked at the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years.2015-08-25 00:00:00Full Article
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